United States District Court, D. Nevada
a former prisoner of the Nevada Department of Corrections
(“NDOC”), has submitted a civil rights complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed an
application to proceed in district court without prepaying
fees or costs. (ECF No. 1, 1-1). The Court grants the
application to proceed in forma pauperis and screens
Plaintiff's civil rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION
has submitted an application to proceed in district court
without prepaying fees or costs. (ECF No. 1). Based on the
financial information provided, the Court grants Plaintiff
leave to proceed without prepayment of fees or costs pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous
or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). This provision applies to all
actions filed in forma pauperis, whether or not the
plaintiff is incarcerated. See Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Calhoun v.
Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
tracks that language. Thus, when reviewing the adequacy of a
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the court
applies the same standard as is applied under Rule 12(b)(6).
See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.
2012) (“The standard for determining whether a
plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure
to state a claim.”). Review under 12(b)(6) is
essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v.
Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000).
reviewing the complaint under this standard, the court must
accept as true the allegations, construe the pleadings in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts
in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Allegations in pro se
complaints are “held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotation marks and
complaint must contain more than a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action, ” it
must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
“The pleading must contain something more . . . than .
. . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of]
a legally cognizable right of action.” Id.
(quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). At a
minimum, a plaintiff should state “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or
her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it
is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint
could not be cured by amendment.” Cato v. United
States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
complaint, Plaintiff sues multiple defendants for events that
took place while Plaintiff was incarcerated at High Desert
State Prison (“HDSP”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 2).
Plaintiff sues Defendants Warden Brian Williams, Assistant
Warden Jerry Howell, Offender Management Administrator
Jennifer Nash, Caseworker Bruce Stroud, and Caseworker
Anderson. (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiff alleges one count
and seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 7, 9).
complaint generally alleges the following: Plaintiff had two
criminal cases pending in state court in Clark County.
(Id. at 3-4). After his conviction on the first
case, Plaintiff entered the custody of the NDOC.
(Id.) Prison officials processed Plaintiff through
initial classification but could not fully classify Plaintiff
due to his pending criminal case. (Id. at 4). After
the resolution of Plaintiff's second criminal case,
Plaintiff requested a full classification hearing.
(Id.) Plaintiff details his kites and requests for a
full classification hearing and prison officials'
responses from April 2015 through April 2017. (Id.
at 4-7). Plaintiff's sentences expired on April 22, 2017
and prison officials released Plaintiff from NDOC custody.
(Id. at 7). Prison officials never conducted a full
classification hearing. (Id.)
alleges Fourteenth Amendment due process violations against
Defendants. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that, by failing
to conduct a full classification hearing pursuant to the
administrative regulations, Defendants denied Plaintiff the
ability to be housed at a minimum level facility or work
camp. (Id.) If Plaintiff would have been classified
at a minimum level facility or a work camp, his sentence
would have been significantly reduced due to credits.
Court finds that Plaintiff fails to allege a colorable due
process claim based on either his classification status or
inability to transfer to a minimum security facility. See
Moody v. Daggett,429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) (holding
that prisoners have no liberty interest in their
classification status); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S.
238, 245 (1983) (holding that “an inmate has no
justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any
particular prison within a State”); and Collins v.
Palczewski,841 F.Supp. 333, 336, 340 (D. Nev. 1993)
(finding that neither the U.S. Constitution, Nevada statutory
law, nor the state's prison ...