United States District Court, D. Nevada
ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
P. GORDON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
a dispute over the amount of insurance coverage available to
defendants Kimberly Schneider and Casandra
Schneider under their insurance policy with
plaintiff GEICO Casualty Company (GEICO). After a motor
vehicle accident in 2015, the defendants obtained the
liability insurance limits from the tortfeasor, and made
claims to GEICO under their underinsured motorist (UIM)
coverage and medical payments coverage.
policy covers six members of the Schneider family and six
different vehicles. It has UIM limits of $15, 000 per
person/$30, 000 per occurrence and medical payments limits of
$5, 000 per person per occurrence. The policy also includes
an anti-stacking provision for each form of coverage. GEICO
paid the defendants $30, 000 under the UIM coverage (the per
occurrence limit) and $15, 000 under the medical payments
coverage (the $5, 000 limit for each person in the vehicle
during the accident). The defendants demanded payment for the
stacked limits of the policy, or $90, 000 per person/$180,
000 per occurrence for UIM and $30, 000 for medical payments.
filed this action, seeking a declaration that its financial
obligations to the defendants under the UIM and medical
payments coverage have been extinguished by the payments
already made. The defendants move for partial summary
judgment, arguing that the UIM anti-stacking provision is
invalid under Nevada Revised Statutes § 687B.145. GEICO
also moves for summary judgment, contending that the
anti-stacking provisions are valid and therefore it has met
its contractual obligations.
parties are familiar with the facts of the case and I will
not repeat them here except where necessary. The medical
payments anti-stacking provision is valid. However, GEICO has
not proven the UIM anti-stacking provision is valid. I
therefore grant GEICO's motion for summary judgment in
part as to the medical payments coverage. I will set a
hearing on the question of the validity of the UIM
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, discovery
responses, and affidavits demonstrate “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a), (c). A fact is material if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). An issue is genuine if “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id.
party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
informing the court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden
then shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific
facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue of material fact
for trial. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212
F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 2000). I view the evidence and draw
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. James River Ins. Co. v. Hebert Schenck,
P.C., 523 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2008).
Nevada Revised Statutes § 687B.145(1), a valid
anti-stacking provision must satisfy three prerequisites.
“First, the limiting provision must be expressed in
clear language. Second, the provision must be prominently
displayed in the policy, binder, or endorsement. Finally, the
insured must not have purchased separate coverage on the same
risk nor paid a premium calculated for full reimbursement
under that coverage.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Coatney, 42 P.3d 265, 267 (Nev. 2002) (quotation
omitted). The “burdens of persuasion and production on
the issue of the validity of an anti-stacking clause . . .
rest on the insurer.” Torres v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 793 P.2d 839, 842 (Nev. 1990).
issue in this case are two nearly identical anti-stacking
provisions. The first limits UIM coverage. Under the heading
“LIMITS OF LIABILITY, ” the
provision appears as follows:
IF YOU OR ANY OTHER INSURED IS IN
(A) IN AN INSURED AUTO WE WILL NOT PAY MORE
THAN THE LIMIT OF COVERAGE FOR THAT PARTICULAR INSURED
(B) IN A MOTOR VEHICLE OTHER THAN YOUR INSURED
AUTO OR WHILE AS A PEDESTRIAN, WE WILL NOT PAY MORE THAN
THE LIMIT OF COVERAGE WHICH YOU HAVE ON ANY ONE ...