United States District Court, D. Nevada
ORDER MOTION TO SUPPRESS [ECF NO.21]
FERENBACH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is Defendant Jacqueline Moore's Motion to
Suppress. (ECF No. 21). For the reasons discussed below,
Defendant's motion is denied.
case, Defendant is charged with being a felon in possession
of a firearm and ammunition. (ECF No. 1). Police found a gun
in Defendant's car and ammunition in her purse after she
allegedly committed a robbery. (ECF No. 21 at 3-4; ECF No. 24
October 27, 2017, 911 received a call from K.O. who stated
that she had been robbed. (ECF No. 21-1). K.O. said that
“Jackie” broke her car window, pointed a small
gun at her, threatened to shoot her, and stole her purse.
(Id.). “Jackie” drove off with a male
passenger in a “gold-ish” “truck.”
(Id.). K.O. described Jackie as black, approximately
37 years old, medium build, with short blonde hair, wearing a
one-piece gray and black jumpsuit. (Id.).
on the 911 call, police began searching the area for a gold
“truck” and the two suspects. (ECF No. 24-4).
Police arrived at the crime scene and interviewed K.O. (ECF
No. 21-4). During the process, K.O. described the male
passenger, “Stacey, ” as a heavy-set,
light-skinned black male. (Id.). K.O. also indicated
that the gold vehicle could have been an SUV. (Id.).
The on-scene officers updated the officers searching for the
suspects regarding “Stacey's” description and
informed the searching officers that the vehicle could also
be an SUV. (Id.).
20 minutes after the 911 call, two officers spotted a gold
SUV with two individuals who matched the descriptions given
by K.O. (ECF No. 24-4). The two officers, with their weapons
drawn, ordered the suspects to lie down face first to wait
for other officers to arrive. (Id.). Police
eventually handcuffed both suspects. (Id.). During
this process, the male responded when the officers called him
“Stacey.” (Id.). Approximately 30
minutes later, officers took K.O. to view the suspects. (ECF
No. 24-9). K.O. positively identified the vehicle, Defendant
as “Jackie”, and the male suspect as
“Stacey.” (Id.). Officers applied for
and were granted a search warrant for the vehicle. (ECF No.
21-2 at 8-9). Officers found a gun in the car and ammunition
in Defendant's purse. (ECF No. 21 at 3-4; ECF No. 24 at
3-4). Officers also determined that Defendant is a convicted
felon and obtained a warrant for her DNA. (ECF No. 21 at 5;
ECF No. 24 at 4)
filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained following
the stop in this case. (ECF No. 21). Defendant argues that
since K.O. was not sure whether the vehicle was a truck or
SUV, officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the
Defendant merely for being in a gold SUV. (Id. at
6). Defendant also asserts that the level of force used by
officers and the delay before Defendant was identified by
K.O. transformed the stop into an arrest. (Id. at
7-8). Finally, Defendant contends that the Government's
application for a search warrant regarding Defendant's
car misrepresented and omitted key facts that undermine the
Court's probable cause determination. In opposition, the
Government argues officers had reasonable suspicion to stop
Defendant based on K.O.'s information, the stop was not
an arrest, and the warrant application did not contain any
material misrepresentation or omission. (ECF No. 24 at 9-11,
15-16). Defendant filed a reply further supporting her
arguments. (ECF No. 27).
Fourth Amendment protects the right of people to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Though the Fourth
Amendment does not specifically preclude admission of
evidence obtained in violation of its provisions, the courts
have established “an exclusionary rule that, when
applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence
at trial.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 139-40 (2009).
Whether this Case Involves a Stop or Arrest
determine the level of cause or suspicion the officers had to
have to take Defendant into custody, the Court must determine
whether this was a stop or arrest. “[A] warrantless
arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a
criminal offense has been or is being committed.”
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). An
investigatory Terry stop must be supported by
reasonable suspicion. United States v. Crapser, 472
F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).
is no bright-line rule to determine when an investigatory
stop becomes an arrest.” Washington v.
Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1996). In
evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the Court
“considers the intrusiveness of the methods used in
light of whether these methods were ‘reasonable given
the specific circumstances.'” Green v. City
& Cty. of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039, 1047 (9th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d
1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court allows
“especially intrusive means” to effectuate a
Terry stop when “the officers' conduct was
a reasonable response to legitimate safety concerns on the
part of the investigating officers, ” such as:
1) where the suspect is uncooperative or takes action at the
scene that raises a reasonable possibility of danger or
flight; 2) where the police have information that the suspect
is currently armed; 3) where the stop closely follows a
violent crime; and 4) where the police have ...