United States District Court, D. Nevada
ORDER [DOCKET NO. 327]
J. Koppe United States Magistrate Judge.
before the Court is Third-Party Plaintiff Shana
McCart-Pollak's motion to compel and for sanctions.
Docket No. 327. Third-Party Defendant Kevin Harrington
filed a response in opposition, and Ms. McCart-Pollak filed a
reply. Docket Nos. 332, 340. The motion is properly decided
without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the
reasons outlined below, the motion to compel is
GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part. The request for sanctions is
discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny
discovery.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732,
751 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998). Parties are entitled
to discover non-privileged information that is relevant to
any party's claim or defense and is proportional to the
needs of the case, including consideration of the importance
of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant
information, the parties' resources, the importance of
the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). The 2015 amendments to the
discovery rules were meant to curb the culture of scorched
earth litigation tactics by emphasizing the importance of
ensuring that the discovery process “provide[s] parties
with efficient access to what is needed to prove a claim or
defense, but eliminate unnecessary or wasteful
discovery.” Roberts v. Clark County School
Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 603-04 (D. Nev. 2016).
party fails to provide discovery, the requesting party may
move to compel that discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a). Conversely, a party from whom discovery is sought may
move for a protective order. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(c). For good cause shown, courts may issue a protective
order to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.
See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2)(C) (courts must limit frequency or extent of
discovery that is otherwise permissible if that discovery is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained
from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive). When a discovery dispute is
presented through the filing of a motion to compel and that
motion is denied, courts may enter any protective order
authorized under Rule 26(c). See Fed. R. Civ. P.
party seeking to avoid discovery bears the burden of showing
why that discovery should not be permitted. Blankenship
v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). The
party resisting discovery must specifically detail the
reasons why each request is irrelevant or otherwise
objectionable, and may not rely on boilerplate, generalized,
conclusory, or speculative arguments. See, e.g.,
F.T.C. v. AMG Servs., Inc., 291 F.R.D. 544, 552 (D.
Nev. 2013). Arguments against discovery must be supported by
“specific examples and articulated reasoning.”
U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Ent., 237 F.R.D. 428, 432
(D. Nev. 2006).
pending motion seeks to compel further responses to three
requests for production (requests numbers 5, 6, and 7) and
two interrogatories (interrogatory numbers 6 and 7). The
Court will address each discovery dispute in turn below.
Request For Production No. 5
for Production No. 5 seeks documents, including contracts and
agreements, between Mr. Harrington and As Seen On TV, Inc.
Docket No. 327 at 4. Mr. Harrington raises a single argument
in responding to the motion, namely that the document request
is improperly duplicative of interrogatories seeking
information on a similar topic. Docket No. 332 at
The Court is not persuaded. “[A] request for production
of documents seeks documents, while an interrogatory is a
question seeking a written response. While the nature of the
information sought may in some respect be ‘duplicative,
' the responses sought take different forms, and
[parties] are entitled to use both vehicles for conducting
discovery.” Becker v. Dahl, 2011 WL 121697, at
*2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2011). There is nothing unusual or
improper about a party seeking an answer to an interrogatory
and separately seeking documents related to that subject
matter. See, e.g., 8B Wright, Miller & Marcus,
Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2163, at p. 8 (2010)
(“After obtaining such information by means of
interrogatories, a party may take depositions of witnesses
and inspect documents or electronically stored information
under Rule 34”). As the only argument presented lacks
merit, the motion to compel with respect to this request will
be granted and a supplemental response shall be served within
14 days of the issuance of this order.
Request For Production No. 6
for Production No. 6 seeks documents, including contracts,
agreements and letters, involving Mary Beth Fasano Gearhart,
regarding the purchase of www.asseenontv.com. Docket No. 327
at 9. Mr. Harrington's only argument in responding to the
motion on this discovery request is the same as he made with
respect to Request for Production No. 5. See Docket
No. 332 at 6-7. For the same reasons as outlined above, that
argument lacks merit and the motion to compel with respect to
this request will be granted and a supplemental response
shall be served within 14 days of the issuance of this order.
Request For Production No. 7
for Production No. 7 seeks “a copy of [Mr.
Harrington's] cell phone and business phone
numbers” for certain months. Docket No. 327 at 11. Mr.
Harrington objects on the grounds that, inter alia,
this request is actually an interrogatory rather than a
request for production. See Docket No. 7. Moreover,
it is unclear to the Court what precisely Ms. McCart-Pollak
is seeking through this discovery request. The request itself
seeks “phone numbers” but Ms. McCart-Pollak
appears to be seeking “phone records” so she can
determine with whom Mr. Harrington was communicating during
the relevant period. Docket No. 340. Hence, it appears Ms.
McCart-Pollak is seeking to compel the production of
documents that are beyond the scope of the request for
production. The Court will not compel the production of
documents that have not been requested. See, e.g.,