United States District Court, D. Nevada
MARK J. SCHWARTZ, Plaintiffs,
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, et al., Defendants.
before the court are three motions in limine filed by
defendant Clark County, Nevada (“Clark County”).
(ECF Nos. 89-91). Plaintiff Mark J. Schwartz
(“Schwartz” or “plaintiff”)
responded. (ECF Nos. 95-97).
before the court is Schwartz's motion to quash Clark
County's designation of persons most knowledgeable to
serve as witnesses at trial. (ECF No. 88). Clark County filed
a response (ECF No. 93), to which Schwartz replied (ECF No.
instant action involves allegations of wrongful termination
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). (ECF
began working for Clark County as an auditor on August 17,
1992. (ECF No. 71-1 at 12). In 2000, plaintiff was promoted
to senior management analyst in the Clark Country Business
License Department (“BL”). (ECF No. 71-1 at 13).
In either 2007 or 2008, plaintiff received an ADA workplace
accommodation to adjust the size of his workplace. (ECF No.
71-1 at 19). From 2005-09, plaintiff received regular,
positive employment evaluations noting his
“meritorious” and “exemplary”
performance. (ECF No. 71-1 at 16-18).
2008, Clark County Human Resources (“HR”) began
to review whether the job title, management analyst, was an
appropriate classification and conducted a county-wide
“management analyst study” in which plaintiff
participated and completed a “job description
questionnaire.” (ECF No. 71-1 at 20, 45). Subsequently,
in August 2009, HR recommended seventeen (17) possible job
title changes for forty-four (44) employees recognized as
management analysts. (ECF No. 71-1 at 45-46). Pursuant to the
management analyst study, three of the five management
analysts at BL, excluding plaintiff, received new job titles.
(ECF No. 71-1 at 38-39).
February 2010, the county manager sent defendant Jacqueline
R. Holloway (“Holloway”), director of business
licensing for Clark County, a “mandate” that
instructed her “to do a reduction in force” by
dismissing employees to decrease BL's budget by 8
percent. (ECF No. 71-1 at 40). To comply with the budget
reduction, Holloway determined that “between 8 to
12” employees would be dismissed, including a manager
of finance, a senior management analyst, a management
analyst, a business license agent, an office supervisor, [an]
office assistant and an IT . . . support person . . . .
[b]ased on [BL's] needs and functions in the department
and also functions and duties that could be absorbed by
others. (ECF No. 71-1 at 41-42).
his job title had not been changed subsequent to the
management analyst study, plaintiff was notified on June 18,
2010, that he would be dismissed as senior management analyst
on July 6, 2010. (ECF No. 71-1 at 20). As a member of a
union, SEIU Local 1107, which had made a collective
bargaining agreement with Clark County, plaintiff appealed
his dismissal pursuant to the process provided under the
terms of the agreement. (ECF No. 71-1 at 15, 23). Upon
reviewing plaintiff's “statements and documents and
other information, ” the layoff review committee
affirmed plaintiff's layoff. (ECF No. 71-1 at 24).
plaintiff filed the underlying complaint alleging three
causes of action: (1) violation of the ADEA; (2) violation of
the ADA; and (3) violation of civil rights under § 1983.
(ECF No. 2-2). The court granted defendants Holloway and
Clark County's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 22),
finding, inter alia, that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether his termination was
motivated by his disability or his age, rather than by
legitimate budgetary concerns. (ECF No. 43).
appealed (ECF No. 46), and the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded on May 27, 2016 (ECF No. 58). The Ninth Circuit
determined that plaintiff raised a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether his selection for layoff was
pretext for unlawful discrimination and that the evidence
supporting plaintiff's ADA and ADEA claims raised a
triable issue as to his § 1983 claim against defendant
Holloway. (ECF No. 58).
20, 2017, the court granted defendant Holloway's motion
for summary judgment as to her qualified immunity on
plaintiff's § 1983 claim. (ECF No. 74). The clerk
entered an amended judgment in favor of defendant Holloway on
June 21, 2017. (ECF No. 77).
Clark County, the remaining defendant, has filed three
motions in limine to exclude certain evidence. (ECF Nos.
Motion in Limine
court must decide any preliminary question about whether . .
. evidence is admissible.” Fed.R.Evid. 104. Motions
in limine are procedural mechanisms by which the
court can make evidentiary rulings in advance of trial, often
to preclude the use of unfairly prejudicial evidence.
United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111-12 (9th
Cir. 2009); Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 1004-05
(9th Cir. 2003).
the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize
in limine rulings, the practice has developed
pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to
manage the course of trials.” Luce v. United
States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1980). Motions in
limine may be used to exclude or admit evidence in
advance of trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 103; United
States v. Williams, 939 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1991)