United States District Court, D. Nevada
C. JONES, UNITED STAT€S DISTRICT JUDGE
action is a pro se petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, by Martice Ransey,
a Nevada prisoner. The respondents have filed an answer,
responding to all the claims in Ransey's petition for
writ of habeas corpus. Ransey did not file a reply. The Court
will deny Ransey's petition.
was convicted on December 13, 2011, following a jury trial in
Nevada's Eighth Judicial District Court, in Clark County,
of assault with a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm
by an ex-felon. See Judgment of Conviction, Exhibit
37 (ECF No. 13-6). Ransey was adjudicated an habitual
criminal, and was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of
fifteen years in prison, with parole eligibility after five
years on each. See id.
appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
of conviction on July 25, 2012, and denied rehearing on
September 12, 2012. See Order of Affirmance, Exhibit
53 (ECF No. 13-22); Order Denying Rehearing, Exhibit 57
15, 2013, Ransey filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in the state district court. See Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus, Exhibit 63 (ECF No. 14-2). The state
district court appointed counsel for Ransey, and, with
counsel, Ransey filed a supplemental petition. See
Order of Appointment, Exhibit 66 (ECF No. 14-5); First
Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Exhibit 67
(ECF No. 14-6). The state district court denied the petition
on May 16, 2014. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, Exhibit 70 (ECF No. 14-9). Ransey appealed, and the
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on February 4, 2015.
See Order of Affirmance, Exhibit 91 (ECF No. 14-30).
Court received Ransey's federal petition for writ of
habeas corpus, initiating this action, pro se, on
May 15, 2015 (ECF No. 6). Ransey's petition asserts the
1. Ransey's trial and appellate counsel was ineffective,
in violation of his federal constitutional rights, because
counsel "[failed] to challenge the [clerk's]
misreading of Ransey's 1992 charge of robbery, which is a
violent offense, as inadmissible evidence pursuant to NRS
48.045...." Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No.
6), p. 3.
2. Ransey's appellate counsel was ineffective, in
violation of his federal constitutional rights, because
counsel "failed to ... provide the [Nevada Supreme
Court] with the bench conference transcripts pertaining to
the denial of admission of Dunson's letter in briefing,
attempt to investigate and [raise] the issue inappropriately
only on rehearing before the [Nevada Supreme Court]."
Id. at 5.
3. Ransey's trial and appellate counsel was ineffective,
in violation of his federal constitutional rights, because
counsel failed to:
1. "adequately represent Ransey after he declined the
plea deal offered by the State;"
2. "visit through 'confidential
3. "conduct an adequate investigation for preparation of
4. "withdraw as requested;"
5. "file pretrial 'motion and writs;'"
6. "require 'good cause' for continuance;"
7. "address 'plea negotiation process;'"
8. "preserve the record;"
9. "address destruction of 'presumption of
10. "request additional jury instructions;"
11. "prepare for sentencing;" and
12. "address viable appeal issues."
Id. at 7.
Ransey's federal constitutional rights were violated
because "[t]he prosecutor overcharged Ransey with
attempted murder when he was aware he did not have sufficient
evidence to support such charge, " and "[h]e
received an indictment from a grand jury utilizing only
children to testify against Ransey to reach the fear* factor
necessary to obtain an indictment." Id.at9.
Ransey's appellate counsel was ineffective, in violation
of his federal constitutional rights, because counsel failed
to raise this issue on his direct appeal. Id. at 9A.
October 19, 2015, respondents filed a motion to dismiss (EOF
No. 11), arguing that Claims 1, 2 and 3 are unexhausted in
state court, and that Claim 3 fails to state a claim because
it is conclusory. See Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
11). In response, on February 22, 2016, Ransey filed a motion
for stay (ECF No. 16), requesting that the case be stayed to
give him an opportunity to exhaust any unexhausted claims.
The Court ruled on those motions, denying both, on May 6,
2016. See Order entered May 6, 2016 (ECXF No. 18).
The Court found all Ransey's claims to be exhausted in
state court, and determined that respondents* argument that
Claim 3 is conclusory would be better addressed in
conjunction with the merits of Ransey's claims. See
Id. The Court denied the motion for stay, as moot,
because there are no unexhausted claims. See id.
then filed an answer (ECF No. 21). Ransey did not file a
reply to the answer.
U.S.C. § 2254(D)
federal court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in
state court unless the state court decision was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law as determined by United States
Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the state-court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A
state-court ruling is "contrary to" clearly
established federal law if it either applies a rule that
contradicts governing Supreme Court law or reaches a result
that differs from the result the Supreme Court reached on
"materially indistinguishable" facts. See Early
v. Packer,537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). A
state-court ruling is "an unreasonable application"
of clearly established federal law under section 2254(d) if
it correctly identifies the governing legal rule but
unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of the particular
case. See Williams v. Taylor,529 U.S. 362, 407-08
(2000). To obtain federal habeas relief for such an
"unreasonable application, " however, a petitioner
must show that the state court's application of Supreme
Court precedent was "objectively unreasonable."
Id. at 409-10; see also Wiggins v. Smith,539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). Or, in other words, habeas
relief is warranted, under the ...