United States District Court, D. Nevada
ORDER
ROBERT
C. JONES, JUDGE
This
case arises from a residential foreclosure by the Falls at
Hidden Canyon Homeowners Association ("the HOA")
for failure to pay HOA fees. Pending before the Court are a
Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 62), and two Motions for Summary
Judgment, (ECF Nos. 64, 65). For the reasons given herein,
the Court grants summary judgment for Plaintiff and denies
the other motions.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In
October 2005, non-party Gwendolyn L. Farrow obtained a $256,
500 mortgage loan to purchase property located at 1852 Fossil
Butte Way, North Las Vegas, Nevada 89032 ("the
Property"). Non-party The Bank of New York Mellon
("BNYM") acquired the note and Deed of Trust
("DOT") by Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust
recorded March 24, 2010.
On
January 5, 2011, as a result of the homeowner's failure
to pay HOA fees, the HOA recorded a lien for delinquent
assessments. The HOA later recorded a notice of default and
election to sell on March 11, 2011, and a notice of
trustee's sale on July 28, 2011. On April 8, 2011, BNYM
requested, through its agent, a payoff ledger identifying the
amount of the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien.
The HOA refused to provide the ledger. On November 15, 2011,
the HOA foreclosed on the Property, acquiring the Property
itself for the sale price of $9, 850. The HOA assigned the
Property to Defendant Las Vegas Development Group, LLC
("LVDG") by quitclaim deed recorded November 23,
2011. LVDG then quitclaimed its interest in the Property to
Defendant Airmotive Investments, LLC ("Airmotive").
Plaintiff Nationstar Mortgage, LLC ("Nationstar")
alleges it later obtained its interest in the Property from
BNYM by a Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded
November 21, 2014.
On July
8, 2015, Nationstar brought this action for quiet title and
declaratory judgment, violation of NRS 116.1113, wrongful
foreclosure, and injunctive relief. On April 26, 2017,
Nationstar filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC").
Nationstar alleges that the HOA's foreclosure sale did
not extinguish BYNM's interest in the Property, and
therefore the title Nationstar acquired from BNYM following
the foreclosure is superior to any interest held by any
Defendant.
The HOA
filed a motion to dismiss the FAC, which the Court granted.
(Order, ECF No. 41.) Nationstar then filed its Second Amended
Complaint, and the HOA moved to dismiss it. The Court granted
that motion in part, finding that Nationstar had not alleged
adequate facts to state a claim of wrongful foreclosure based
on violations of the applicable CC&Rs. (Order 4-5, ECF
No. 60.) However, the Court declined to dismiss
Nationstar's quiet title claim. On October 27, 2017,
Nationstar filed its Third Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 61.)
The HOA moves again to dismiss. (Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 62.)
In addition, both the HOA and Nationstar have moved for
summary judgment. (Mots. Summ. J., ECF Nos. 64, 65.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A court
must grant summary judgment when "the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may affect
the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a
material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for
a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. See Id. A principal purpose of summary
judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
In
determining summary judgment, a court uses a burden-shifting
scheme. The moving party must first satisfy its initial
burden. "When the party moving for summary judgment
would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward
with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if
the evidence went uncontroverted at trial." C.A.R.
Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d
474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears
the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party
can meet its burden in two ways: (I) by presenting evidence
to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's
case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed
to make a showing sufficient to establish an element
essential to that party's case on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24.
If the
moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary
judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the
nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). If the moving party
meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the
opposing party to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the
existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not
establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor.
It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be
shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties'
differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W.
Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass 'n,
809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). In other words, the
nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying
solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by facts.
See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions
and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts
by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue
for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
At the
summary judgment stage, a court's function is not to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth, but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant
is "to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are
to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255. But if
the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is
not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.
See Id. at 249-50. Notably, facts are only viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party where there
is a genuine dispute about those facts. Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). That is, even where
the underlying claim contains a reasonableness test, where a
party's evidence is so clearly contradicted by the record
as a whole that no reasonable jury could believe it, "a
court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes
of ruling on a motion for summary judgment."
Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
a.
Quiet and ...