United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is defendant Kupperlin Law Group, LLC's
(“Kupperlin”) first motion for partial summary
judgment. (ECF No. 33). Plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon
(“BNYM”) filed a response (ECF No. 43), to which
Kupperlin replied (ECF No. 48).
before the court is Kupperlin's second motion for partial
summary judgment. (ECF No. 35). Plaintiff filed a response
(ECF No. 44), to which Kupperlin replied (ECF No. 47).
before the court is plaintiff's motion to dismiss
Kupperlin's counterclaim. (ECF No. 42). Kupperlin filed a
response (ECF No. 45), to which plaintiff replied (ECF No.
action involves the parties' interests in real property
located at 11966 Port Labelle Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada, 89141
(“the property”). (ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff's interest in the property
August 26, 2005, Michael and Julia Frye (“the
Fryes”) obtained a loan from Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc. (“Countrywide”) for $1, 000, 000 to finance
ownership of the property. (ECF No. 59-1). The Fryes executed
a promissory note in favor of Countrywide, as well as a deed
of trust to secure repayment of the loan. Id. The
deed of trust, recorded on August 31, 2005, listed
Countrywide as the lender and Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the
beneficiary solely as nominee for the lender and the
lender's successors and assigns. Id.
September 12, 2011, MERS executed a corporate assignment of
deed of trust, naming plaintiff as beneficiary. Id.
Defendants' interest in the property
December 12, 2008, Red Rock Financial Services
(“RRFS”), acting on behalf of defendant
Christopher Communities at Southern Highlands Golf Club
Homeowners Association (“the HOA”) recorded a
notice of delinquent assessment lien, stating an amount due
of $2, 275.03. (ECF No. 1). On February 20, 2009, RRFS, on
behalf of the HOA, recorded a notice of default and election
to sell, stating an amount due of $3, 871.58. Id.
some point in time before September 7, 2012, First 100
entered into an agreement with the HOA to purchase the
delinquency, if any, owed by the [Fryes] to the HOA.”
Id. “Per the purchase and sale agreement,
[RRFS] was removed as the HOA's agent and replaced with
Kupperlin.” Id. “First 100 transferred a
sum of money equal to nine months of unpaid assessments to
the HOA in exchange to [sic] the rights to collect on the
alleged delinquent account and foreclose upon the
property.” Id. “Kupperlin was instructed
not to postpone any foreclosure sale, even if few or no
bidders were present.” Id.
September 7, 2012, Kupperlin, on behalf of the HOA, recorded
a notice of foreclosure sale. Id. On September 29,
2012, Kupperlin foreclosed against the property. Id.
Defendant First 100 purchased the property at the foreclosure
sale for $22, 346.67. Id. A foreclosure deed was
recorded on October 4, 2012. Id. On February 4,
2013, First 100 transferred its interest in the property to
the Lahrs Family Trust (“the Trust”).
challenges the legal effect of the September 29, 2012, HOA
foreclosure sale and seeks to preserve its pre-sale interest
in the property. Id. Plaintiff alleges the following
causes of action: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment
against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 against
the HOA and Kupperlin; (3) wrongful foreclosure against the
HOA and Kupperlin; (4) injunctive relief against the Trust;
and (5) deceptive trade practices against the HOA and
30, 2017, Kupperlin filed a counterclaim against
plaintiff's attorney, Natalie Winslow. (ECF No. 29). The
filing states that Kupperlin sent Winslow letters informing
her that plaintiff's complaint failed to state viable
causes of action against Kupperlin. Id. Kupperlin
requested that Winslow withdraw or voluntarily dismiss her
client's claims against Kupperlin, and threatened to file
a counterclaim against her if she failed to do so.
Id. When Winslow did not withdraw her client's
claims against Kupperlin, it filed a counterclaim against
Winslow, alleging a statutory violation of NRS §
Motion for summary judgment
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to ...