United States District Court, D. Nevada
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO BAC HOMES LOANS SERVICING, LP, f/k/a COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, Plaintiff,
TERRACES AT ROSE LAKE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants. SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, Counter/Cross Claimant,
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, f/k/a COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, et al., Counter/Cross Defendants.
M. NAVARRO, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
(ECF No. 63), filed by Defendant SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC
(“SFR”). Plaintiff Bank of America, N.A.
(“BANA”) filed a Response, (ECF No. 65), and SFR
filed a Reply, (ECF No. 66).
pending before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, (ECF No. 64), filed by BANA. SFR filed a Response,
(ECF No. 76),  and BANA filed a Reply, (ECF No. 87).
pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment,
(ECF No. 78), filed by SFR. BANA filed a Response, (ECF No.
89), and SFR filed a Reply, (ECF No. 95). For the reasons
discussed herein, the Court GRANTS
BANA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
DENIES SFR's Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment and Summary Judgment.
case arises out of the non-judicial foreclosure on real
property located at 3420 Catherine Mermet Avenue, North Las
Vegas, Nevada 89091 (the “Property”). (Compl.
¶ 1, ECF No. 1). In March of 2007, Engelbert Espinosa
and Charito Espinosa purchased the Property by way of a loan
in the amount of $237, 927.00 secured by a Deed of Trust
(“DOT”) recorded on March 15, 2007. (Id.
¶¶ 12-13). The DOT identifies CTX Mortgage Company,
LLC (“CTX”) as the original lender (Id.
¶ 13). In June of 2007, the Federal National Mortgage
Association (“Fannie Mae”) purchased the loan,
obtaining an ownership interest in the DOT. (Id.
¶ 14). BANA acquired an interest in the DOT through a
corporation assignment of deed of trust in July of 2010.
(Id. ¶ 15).
22, 2010, Defendant Alessi & Koenig, LLC
(“A&K”) recorded a notice of delinquent
assessment against the Property on behalf of Defendant
Terraces at Rose Lake Homeowners Association
(“HOA”). (Id. ¶ 22). On October 15,
2010, a notice of default and election to sell was recorded
to satisfy the delinquent assessment lien. (Id.
10, 2011, BANA, as servicer for Fannie Mae, remitted payment
to HOA through A&K. (Id. ¶ 31). Although
BANA requested the super-priority amount HOA alleged was due,
HOA did not provide this amount. (Id. ¶ 32).
Nevertheless, BANA tendered what it calculated was the
super-priority amount to HOA through A&K on May 10, 2011.
(Id. ¶ 34). On May 25, 2011, A&K, on behalf
of HOA, recorded a trustee's deed upon sale indicating
that HOA purchased the property. (Id. ¶ 35). On
November 6, 2013, HOA transferred its interest in the
property to SFR through a quitclaim deed. (Id.
17, 2016, BANA filed its Complaint claiming the following
causes of action against various parties involved in the
foreclosure and subsequent sale of the Property: (1)
declaratory relief; (2) quiet title; (3) breach of Nevada
Revised Statute (“NRS”) § 116.1113; (4)
wrongful foreclosure; and (5) injunctive relief. (Id.
12, 2016, SFR filed its Answer, (ECF No. 19), that asserted
counterclaims against BANA for quiet title and injunctive
relief. (SFR's Answer 15:14-16:4). In response, BANA
filed an Answer asserting, inter alia, an
affirmative defense that “NRS Chapter 116 is facially
unconstitutional because its ‘opt-in' notice
provisions do not mandate reasonable and affirmative steps to
be taken to give actual notice to a record lien holder before
depriving the lien holder of its property rights . . .
.” (BANA's Answer 9:17-20, ECF No. 27).
August 10, 2017, SFR filed the instant Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 63), and on August 31, 2017, BANA
filed its Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (ECF
No. 64). SFR filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on October
5, 2017, (ECF No. 78).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary
adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the
case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if
there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return
a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable
jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's
favor.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship,
521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999)). A
principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or
defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways:
(1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of
the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that
the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to
establish an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at ...