United States District Court, D. Nevada
M. NAVARRO, CHIEF JUDGE
before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No.
77), filed by Plaintiff Platinum Realty and Holdings, LLC
(“Plaintiff”) against Defendant Reva Larsen
(“Larsen”) and Defendant Bank of America, N.A.
“Defendants”).Also pending before the Court is the
Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 78), filed by BANA.
Plaintiff filed a Response, (ECF No. 79), and BANA filed a
Reply, (ECF No. 80). For the reasons discussed below, the
Court GRANTS BANA's Motion and
DENIES Plaintiff's Motion.
filed its Complaint in state court on January 3, 2014,
asserting claims involving the non-judicial foreclosure on
real property located at 10416 Amber Night Street, Las Vegas,
Nevada 89183, APN 177-26-420-007 (the
“Property”). (Ex. 1 to Pet. for Removal
(“Compl.”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 1-1). On August 14,
2008, Defendant Reva Larson (“Larson”) purchased
the Property by way of a loan in the amount of $214, 751.00
secured by a Deed of Trust (“DOT”) recorded
August 20, 2008. (DOT, Ex. 3 to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J.
(“MSJ”), ECF No. 77-3).
5, 2012, KB Silverado HOA (“HOA”), through its
agent Absolute Collection Services, LLC (“Absolute
Collection Services”), recorded a notice of delinquent
assessment lien. (Pl.'s MSJ 6:18-20). On August 9, 2012,
HOA recorded a notice of default and election to sell to
satisfy the delinquent assessment lien. (Id.
6:21-23). On December 6, 2012, HOA recorded a notice of
trustee's sale. (Id. 6:24-26). On May 14, 2013,
non-party CSC Acquisition and Holding, LLC
(“CSC”) purchased the Property by way of a public
lien foreclosure sale pursuant to NRS § 116.1113.
(Id. 6:27-7:2). On May 23, 2013, Plaintiff obtained
title to the Property by way of quitclaim deed between
Plaintiff and CSC Acquisitions in which Plaintiff paid $11,
500.00 for the Property. (Id. 5:16-17, 5:21-22).
asserts quiet title with a requested remedy of declaratory
judgment against Larsen and BANA. (Compl. ¶¶
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary
adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the
case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if
there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return
a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable
jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's
favor.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship,
521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999)). A
principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or
defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways:
(1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of
the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that
the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to
establish an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving
party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must
be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving
party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To
establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing
party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid
summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations
that are unsupported by factual data. Taylor v.
List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the
opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of
the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing
competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of
the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.
Id. at 249-50.
and BANA conversely seek summary judgment for quiet title and
declaratory relief. The Court first considers the impact of
the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Bourne Valley Court
Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 832 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, No. 16-1208, 2017 WL 1300223
(U.S. June 26, 2017).
The Scope and ...