United States District Court, D. Nevada
HIEP D. LE, Plaintiff,
BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCATION; EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC., Defendants
ORDER PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 26) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 30)
RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
this Court comes Plaintiff Hiep D. Le
(“Plaintiff” or “Le”)'s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26), and Defendant
Equifax Information Services, LLC (“Defendant” or
“Equifax”)'s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 30). For the reasons set forth below, both motions are
October 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with Jury
Demand against Bank of America, National Association
(“Bank of America”) and Equifax Information
Services, LLC, alleging violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”). (ECF No. 1).
filed its Answer with Jury Demand on January 26, 2017. (ECF
No. 16). On August 24, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 26). The same
day, Equifax filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No.
30). Equifax filed a Response to Plaintiff's Motion on
September 28, 2017. (ECF No. 37). The same day, Plaintiff
filed a Response to Defendant's Motion. (ECF No. 39). On
October 12, 2017, Equifax filed a Reply to its Motion. (ECF
No. 48). Equifax filed a Notice (ECF No. 51) that the parties
had stipulated to Equifax withdrawing its earlier filed
Response, and filed another Response on October 16, 2017.
(ECF No. 52). Plaintiff filed a Reply to his Motion on
October 30, 2017. (ECF No. 54).
Motion for Summary Judgment
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a); accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). When considering the propriety of summary
judgment, the court views all facts and draws all inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 747 F.3d 789, 793 (9th
movant has carried its burden, the non-moving party
“must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine
issue for trial.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007) (alteration in original) (quotation marks
The Fair Credit Reporting Act
enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x, in 1970 ‘to ensure
fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the
banking system, and protect consumer privacy.'”
Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d
1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007)). “As an important
means to this end, the Act sought to make ‘consumer
reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities [in
assembling and evaluating consumers' credit, and
disseminating information about consumers' credit] with
fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's
right to privacy.'” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4)).
FCRA expressly creates a private right of action for willful
or negligent noncompliance with its requirements. . . .
However, § 1681s-2 limits this private right of action
to claims arising under subsection (b), the duties triggered
upon notice of a dispute from a CRA.” Id. at
1154 (citations omitted); see also Nelson v. Chase
Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1059-60 (9th Cir.
2002) (“That with these words Congress created a
private right of action for consumers cannot be doubted. That
right is to sue for violation of any requirement
“imposed with respect to any consumer.”)
Section 1681i ...