United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is defendant Antelope Homeowners
Association's (the “HOA”) motion to dismiss.
(ECF No. 35). Defendant SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC
(“SFR”) (ECF No. 40) and plaintiff JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. (“JPMorgan”) (ECF No. 44) filed
responses, to which the HOA replied (ECF No. 60).
before the court is SFR's motion to dismiss. (ECF No.
41). JPMorgan filed a response (ECF No. 45), to which SFR
replied (ECF No. 46).
case involves a dispute over real property located at 7828
Drydust Ct., Las Vegas, Nevada (the “property”).
On July 14, 2008, a deed of trust securing a loan made to
Horatio and Elizabeth Rocha (the “borrowers”) in
the amount of $218, 529.00 was recorded. (ECF No. 1).
alleges that it is the beneficiary to the deed of trust. (ECF
No. 1). JPMorgan further alleges that the HOA, through its
agents, has recorded several notices against the property: a
notice of delinquent assessment lien; a notice of breach and
election to sell, and a notice of sale. (ECF No. 1 at 3).
JPMorgan alleges that the HOA did not provide JPMorgan with
proper notice of these recordings and that the recordings did
not specify the superpriority amount owed. (ECF No. 1 at 3).
November 19, 2013, the HOA conducted a foreclosure sale,
during which SFR purchased the property for $19, 000.00. (ECF
February 2, 2017, JPMorgan filed the underlying complaint,
alleging three causes of action: (1) declaratory judgment
against SFR; (2) quiet title against SFR; and (3) unjust
enrichment against SFR. (ECF No. 1).
12, 2017, SFR filed a counterclaim against JPMorgan for quiet
title and injunctive relief and a crossclaim against Horation
and Elizabeth Rocha for the same. (ECF No. 16).
instant motion, the HOA moves to dismiss JPMorgan's
claims against it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). (ECF No. 35). In SFR's motion to dismiss, SFR
argues that the HOA is a necessary party and moves to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) if the HOA is dismissed. (ECF No.
may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “[a]
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2);
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations, it demands “more than labels and
conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).
Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step
approach district courts are to apply when considering
motions to dismiss. First, the court must accept as true all
well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however,
legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of
truth. Id. at 678-79. Mere recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Id. at 678.
the court must consider whether the factual allegations in
the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief.
Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the
plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allow the court
to draw a reasonable ...