Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Marutyan v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

United States District Court, D. Nevada

March 13, 2018




         I. SUMMARY

         Before the Court are three motions: (1) Defendant Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department's (“LVMPD”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claims for Violations of Substantive Due Process, the Second Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (“Motion to Dismiss”) (ECF No. 44); (2) Defendant LVMPD's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to Stay Proceedings During the Pendency of Plaintiffs' State Court Case (“Motion to Stay”) (ECF No. 45); and (3) Plaintiffs Ara V. Marutyan, Arthur Marutyan, and Diana Marutyan's Motion for Evidentiary Hearing (ECF No. 50). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and denies Defendant's Motion to Stay as well as Plaintiffs' Motion for Evidentiary Hearing.


         Plaintiffs allege that LVMPD violated their Fourth Amendment and procedural due process rights when police officers seized personal property during searches of their home and Diana Marutyan's dorm room.

         Plaintiffs allege that LVMPD officers executed search warrants at their home on several occasions starting on February 13, 2014, and ending on March 27, 2014. (ECF No. 43 at 2.) During these searches, the officers seized more than 100 items including firearms, cell phones, computers, passports, social security cards, birth certificates, and other documents.[1] (Id.) LVMPD executed a search warrant for the dorm room of Plaintiff Diana Marutyan and seized a cell phone on April 3, 2014. (Id. at 3.)

         Plaintiffs allege that they were never charged with a crime and that LVMPD never commenced any civil forfeiture proceedings for the seized property. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiffs further allege that they have contacted LVMPD many times in an attempt to recover their property but have been unsuccessful. (Id. at 5.)

         Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in Clark County District Court (“State Suit”) on April 15, 2015. (ECF No. 31 at 2.) The State Suit sought return of the property, compensatory damages, and attorney's fees. (Id.) The court dismissed the case as a result of Plaintiffs' continued failure to name an indispensable party, and that issue is currently on appeal before the Nevada Supreme Court. (ECF No. 45 at 2.)

         Plaintiffs initiated this action more than a year after filing the State Suit. (ECF No. 31 at 2.) This Court previously dismissed several of Plaintiffs' claims. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiffs' claims for violation of the Second Amendment and substantive due process rights were dismissed with prejudice. (Id.) Plaintiffs' claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment was dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. (Id.)


         A court may dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A properly pleaded complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.

         In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations-but not legal conclusions-in the complaint. Id. at 678. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. Second, a district court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

         Allegations in pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and must be liberally construed. See Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010).


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.