United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is defendants Ira Hollingsworth and Bryan
Wilson's (collectively, “defendants”) motion
for summary judgment. (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff Luis
Urenda-Bustos filed a response. (ECF No. 23). Defendants have
not replied, and the time for doing so has since passed.
before the court is defendants' motion to strike. (ECF
No. 24). Plaintiff has not responded, and the time for doing
so has since passed.
alleges that on September 18, 2013, defendant Foley,
senior correctional officer at Southern Desert Correctional
Center (“SDCC”), forcibly put hand restraints on
plaintiff that cut off the circulation to plaintiff's
hands. (ECF No. 4). Plaintiff alleges that the restraints
left indentations and subdermal hematoma bruising on
plaintiff's wrist. Id.
brought the injuries to the attention of defendant
Hollingsworth, a caseworker at SDCC. (ECF No. 4). Defendant
Hollingsworth sent plaintiff to see a nurse for medical
attention. Id. Plaintiff asserts that defendant
Hollingsworth did not report plaintiff's injury, as
required by administrative regulations, in an attempt to
cover up Foley's actions. Id.
began the informal grievance process. (ECF No. 4). Plaintiff
submitted numerous informal grievances, the last of which was
rejected on March 17, 2015. (ECF No. 17).
issued plaintiff a notice of charges of a disciplinary
violation due to the nurse's statement that
plaintiff's injuries were “self-inflicted.”
(ECF No. 4). On October 1, 2013, a disciplinary hearing was
held regarding the charges Officer Foley brought against
plaintiff. (ECF No. 17). Defendant Wilson, a Sergeant at
SDCC, adjudicated the disciplinary hearing. (ECF No. 4).
Wilson found plaintiff guilty of the charges and reduced
plaintiff's custody level. Id.
to a screening order (ECF No. 4), in relevant part, plaintiff
was permitted to proceed on one count of retaliation against
defendants Foley, Hollingsworth, Wilson, and unidentified
medical staff. (ECF No. 17).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to withstand summary judgment, the nonmoving party
must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Id.
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of
proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its
burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an
essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2)
by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden,
summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159- 60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). The opposing party need not establish a dispute of
material fact conclusively in its favor. See T.W. Elec.
Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809
F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). It is sufficient that
“the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury
or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of
the truth at trial.” Id.
other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary
judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are
unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880
F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must
go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and
set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that
shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether a
genuine dispute exists for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The
evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”
Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving
party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative,
summary judgment may be granted. See Id. at 249-50.