United States District Court, D. Nevada
MIRANDA M. DU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is the Report and Recommendation of United States
Magistrate Judge Valerie P. Cooke (ECF No. 3)
(“R&R”) relating to Plaintiff's
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP
Application”) (ECF No. 1) and pro se complaint
(ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiff filed her objection on November 6,
2017 (“Objection”). (ECF No. 4.)
reasons discussed herein, the Court accepts in part and
rejects in part the Magistrate Judge's R&R.
an individual with disabilities who resides in Lyon County,
Nevada, brings seven purported claims for relief relating to
incidents arising from a Nevada Department of Health and
Human Services Division of Welfare and Supportive Services
(“DWSS”) Administrative Adjudication Office
(“AAO”) hearing to redetermine her application
and eligibility for Supplemental Nutrition Assistant Program
(“SNAP”) benefits. This Court adopts the more
detailed summary of the complaint's allegations in the
R&R (ECF No. 3 at 3-4).
Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Where a party
timely objects to a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation, then the court is required to “make a
de novo determination of those portions of the
[report and recommendation] to which objection is
made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Where a party fails
to object, however, the court is not required to conduct
“any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the
subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140, 149 (1985). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has
recognized that a district court is not required to review a
magistrate judge's report and recommendation where no
objections have been filed. See United States v.
Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003)
(disregarding the standard of review employed by the district
court when reviewing a report and recommendation to which no
objections were made); see also Schmidt v.
Johnstone, 263 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003)
(reading the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Reyna-Tapia as adopting the view that district
courts are not required to review “any issue that is
not the subject of an objection.”). Thus, if there is
no objection to a magistrate judge's recommendation, then
the court may accept the recommendation without review.
See, e.g., Johnstone, 263 F.Supp.2d at 1226
(accepting, without review, a magistrate judge's
recommendation to which no objection was filed).
light of Plaintiff's objection to the R&R, the Court
conducts a de novo review to determine whether to
adopt the R&R.
Magistrate Judge recommends granting Plaintiff's IFP
Application. Plaintiff does not object to this
recommendation. (ECF No. 3 at 1.) Accordingly, the Court will
accept the recommendation.
Magistrate Judge further recommends that the complaint be
dismissed with prejudice in its entirety based on the
doctrine of Burford abstention. (ECF No. 3 at 6.)
After performing a de novo review, the Court rejects
the Magistrate Judge's findings in whole but accepts the
Magistrate Judge's recommendations in part.
Claims in the Complaint
the complaint identifies seven distinct claims for relief,
three of the claims appear to be redundant.
first claim is entitled “14th Amendment of
the United States Constitution” and states that
Plaintiff was denied adequate notice under the Due Process
Clause by “[n]ot having rules on evidence exchange and
not receiving information in a timely manner.” (ECF No.
1-1 at 4.) The Court construes this claim as a claim for
violation of Plaintiff's procedural due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
second claim is entitled “Constitutional [sic]
Article VI” and states that “[c]alculations [of
SNAP benefits] given by the Federal government is
[sic] considered to be the Supreme Law of the
Land” and “[d]eviations in state calculations
deprive Plaintiff of the property interest in receiving
benefits.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 4.) The Court construes this
as an attempt to bring an independent claim for relief under
the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause, U.S.
Const. art. VI, § 1, and/or a claim that the state
agency officer's calculations of her eligibility for SNAP
are preempted by federal law.
third claim is entitled “Regulations of the Department
of Agriculture 7 C.F.R [sic] 273” and lists a
variety of Department of Agriculture (“USDA”)
regulations relating to SNAP eligibility determination and
the process by which a state agency conducts hearings to
determine SNAP eligibility. (ECF No. 1-1 at 5-9 (citing 7
C.F.R. §§ 273.2, 273.8, 273.9, 273.10, 273.15).)
The Court construes this claim as being redundant with
Plaintiff's second claim although the Court incorporates
the federal regulations cited to by Plaintiff as part of that
fourth claim is entitled “42 USC 1983” and states
that “there is a private right of action under section
1983 to enforce the fair hearings requirement of the Medicaid
Act.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 9.) The Court ...