United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is defendant Southern Highlands Community
Association's (the “HOA”) motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 73). Plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon
(“BNYM”) filed a response. (ECF No. 79).
before the court is BNYM's motion for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 74). The HOA (ECF No. 78) and SFR Investments Pool
1, LLC (“SFR”) (ECF No. 81) responded, to which
BNYM replied (ECF Nos. 82, 85).
before the court is defendant SFR's motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 75). BNYM responded (ECF No. 80), to which
SFR replied (ECF No. 84).
case involves a dispute over real property located at 11545
Cantina Terlano Place, Las Vegas, Nevada 89141 (the
“property”). On August 11, 2005, Salma Khan
obtained a loan in the amount of $838, 150.00 to purchase the
property, which was secured by a deed of trust recorded on
October 10, 2005. (ECF No. 1).
deed of trust was assigned to BNYM via an assignment of deed
of trust recorded on December 23, 2009. (ECF No. 1).
January 27, 2011, defendant Alessi & Koenig, LLC
(“A&K”), acting on behalf of the HOA, recorded a
notice of delinquent assessment lien, stating an amount due
of $895.02. (ECF No. 1).
April 12, 2011, Khan recorded a loan modification agreement
increasing the principal balance under the loan to $1, 000,
706.62. (ECF No. 1).
April 20, 2011, A&K recorded a notice of default and election
to sell to satisfy the delinquent assessment lien, stating an
amount due of $2, 161.47. (ECF No. 1). On September 8, 2011,
A&K recorded a notice of trustee's sale, stating an
amount due of $3, 709.87. (ECF No. 1). On July 11, 2012, SFR
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale for $9,
200.00. (ECF No. 1). A trustee's deed upon sale in favor
of SFR was recorded on July 24, 2012. (ECF No. 1).
25, 2016, BNYM filed the underlying complaint. (ECF No. 1).
On October 12, 2016, BNYM filed an amended complaint,
alleging seven causes of action: (1) quiet title/declaratory
judgment against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113
against A&K and the HOA; (3) wrongful foreclosure against A&K
and the HOA; (4) injunctive relief against SFR; (5) deceptive
trade practices against A&K and the HOA; (6) judicial
foreclosure against Khan; and (7) alternative claim for
breach of contract against Khan. (ECF No. 12).
October 24, 2016, SFR filed an answer and counterclaim
against BNYM for quiet title/declaratory relief and
injunctive relief. (ECF No. 19).
3, 2017, the court dismissed claims (2) through (5) of
BNYM's amended complaint (ECF No. 12), as well as claim
(2) of SFR's counterclaim (ECF No. 19). (ECF No. 72). The
court also denied SFR's motion for partial summary
judgment (ECF No. 51) pursuant to Article III's
prohibition against advisory opinions. Id.
instant motions, the HOA, BNYM, and SFR each move the court
to grant summary judgment in its favor as to the last
remaining cause of action alleged in BNYM's amended
complaint: quiet title/declaratory relief. The court will
address each parties' motions as it sees fit. . . .
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy
its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary
judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must
come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of
proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its
burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an
essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2)
by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden,
summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159- 60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute,
the opposing party need not establish a material issue of
fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that
“the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury
or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of
the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac.
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary
judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are
unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880
F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must
go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and
set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that
shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the
nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Id.
HOA and SFR's motions, they contend that summary judgment
in their favor is proper because, inter alia, the
foreclosure sale extinguished BNYM's deed of trust
pursuant to NRS 116.3116 and SFR Investments. (ECF
Nos. 73, 75). The HOA and SFR further contend that the
foreclosure sale should not be set aside because the price
paid at the foreclosure sale was commercially reasonable, the
HOA complied with all notice requirements under NRS 116, BNYM
has not shown fraud, unfairness, or oppression as outlined in
Shadow Wood Homeowners Assoc. v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp.,
Inc., 366 P.3d 1105 (Nev. 2016) (“Shadow
Wood”), and because BNYM failed to tender the
super-priority portion of the lien. (ECF Nos. 73, 75). The
Nevada law, “[a]n action may be brought by any person
against another who claims an estate or interest in real
property, adverse to the person bringing the action for the
purpose of determining such adverse claim.” Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 40.010. “A plea to quiet title does not
require any particular elements, but each party must plead
and prove his or her own claim to the property in question
and a plaintiff's right to relief therefore depends on
superiority of title.” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank
Nat'l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Therefore,
for plaintiff to succeed on its quiet title action, it needs
to show that its claim to the property is superior to all
others. See also Breliant v. Preferred Equities
Corp., 918 P.2d 314, 318 (Nev. 1996) (“In a quiet
title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to
prove good title in himself.”).
116.3116(1) of the NRS gives an HOA a lien on its
homeowners' residences for unpaid assessments and fines.
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(1). Moreover, NRS 116.3116(2)
gives priority to that HOA lien over all other liens and
encumbrances with limited exceptions-such as “[a] first
security interest on the unit recorded before the date on