United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is defendant/counterclaimant Prestwick Court
Trust's (“Prestwick”) motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 70). Plaintiff/counter defendant Guild
Mortgage Company (“Guild”) filed a response and
counterclaim for summary judgment (ECF No. 75), to which
Prestwick replied (ECF No. 84).
before the court is defendant Canyon Crest Master
Association's (the “HOA”) motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 74). Guild filed a response. (ECF No. 77).
before the court is Guild's motion for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 76). Prestwick filed a response (ECF No. 83), to
which the HOA joined (ECF No. 86), and to which Guild replied
(ECF No. 87).
present case involves a dispute over real property located at
247 Prestwick Court, Mesquite, Nevada 89027 (the
“property”). (ECF No. 1).
November 29, 2011, Mesquite 52 LLC deeded the property to
Anibal C. Estrada (“Estrada”). (ECF No. 1).
Estrada obtained a mortgage loan in the amount of $180,
285.00 from Guild, using the property as collateral. (ECF No.
75). The loan was insured by Federal Housing Administration
(“FHA”). Id. Estrada granted Guild a
deed of trust, which Guild subsequently recorded. (ECF No.
then became delinquent on his HOA assessments. (ECF No. 75).
On or about December 21, 2012, the HOA filed a notice of
delinquent assessment lien in the amount of $1, 253.27 via
its foreclosure agent, Alessi & Koenig, LLC
(“Alessi & Koenig”). (ECF No. 1).
6, 2013, Alessi & Koenig then filed a notice of default
and election to sell under homeowners association lien,
claiming a lien in the amount of $2, 469.81. Id.
Alessi & Koenig mailed copies of the notice of default
and election to sell to Estrada, MERS, Guild, and other
interested parties. (ECF No. 70).
October 10, 2013, Alessi & Koenig recorded a notice of
foreclosure sale, claiming a lien in the amount of $4,
538.40. Id.; (ECF No. 1). Copies of the notice of
foreclosure sale were mailed to Estrada, Guild, and other
interested parties. Id. The notice of sale was also
published in the Nevada Legal News. Id.
November 6, 2013, Alessi & Koenig conducted the public
foreclosure sale of the property. Id. Prestwick
purchased the property for $20, 100.00 at the foreclosure
sale. Id. On November 18, 2013, Alessi & Koenig
recorded a trustee's deed upon sale conveying the
property to Prestwick. (ECF No. 74).
the foreclosure sale extinguished the deed of trust, MERS
executed an assignment of deed of trust assigning all
beneficial interest and all rights accrued or to accrue under
the deed of trust to Guild. (ECF No. 70).
February 12, 2015, Guild filed the underlying complaint
against the HOA and Prestwick, alleging six causes of action:
(1) declaratory relief regarding the facial
unconstitutionality of NRS 116; (2) declaratory relief that
the foreclosure sale amounted to an unconstitutional taking
under NRS 116; (3) the transfer to Prestwick was voidable
under NRS 112.190; (4) declaratory relief that the HOA sale
was commercially unreasonable and therefore void; (5)
declaratory relief that the HOA sale was unconstitutional as
it was preempted by federal law; (6) and quiet title. (ECF
February 22, 2017, the court denied both Prestwick (to which
the HOA joined) (ECF No. 43) and Guild's (ECF No. 40)
motions for summary judgment. (ECF No. 53). On March 8, 2017,
Magistrate Judge Ferenbach granted the parties'
stipulation to reopen and extend discovery.
instant motion, Prestwick again moves for summary judgment
against Guild seeking quiet title and declaratory relief in
its favor. (ECF No. 70). The HOA (ECF No. 74) and Guild (ECF
No. 76) each also filed motions for summary judgment.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy
its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary
judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must
come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of
proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its
burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an
essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2)
by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden,
summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159- 60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary
judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are
unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880
F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must
go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and
set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that
shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the
nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Id.
Prestwick's motion, it contends that summary judgment in
its favor is proper because, inter alia, the
foreclosure sale extinguished Guild's deed of trust
pursuant to NRS 116.3116 and SFR Investments. (ECF
No. 70). Prestwick further contends that the foreclosure sale
should not be set aside because Guild has not shown fraud,
unfairness, or oppression as outlined in Shadow Wood
Homeowners Assoc. v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp., Inc., 366 P.3d
1105 (Nev. 2016) (“Shadow Wood”),
Prestwick is a bona fide purchaser, Guild failed to protect
its interest in advance of the foreclosure sale, and because
due process concerns were not implicated. (ECF No. 70). The
court agrees. As the claims set forth in the HOA's motion
for summary judgment align with those asserted in
Prestwick's, a finding in favor of Prestwick's motion
means the same for the HOA's.
Nevada law, “[a]n action may be brought by any person
against another who claims an estate or interest in real
property, adverse to the person bringing the action for the
purpose of determining such adverse claim.” Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 40.010. “A plea to quiet title does not
require any particular elements, but each party must plead
and prove his or her own claim to the property in question
and a plaintiff's right to relief therefore depends on
superiority of title.” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank
Nat'l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,
for claimant to succeed on its quiet title action, it needs
to show that its claim to the property is superior to all
others. See Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp.,
918 P.2d 314, 318 (Nev. 1996) (“In a quiet title
action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to prove
good title in himself.”).
116.3116(1) of the NRS gives an HOA a lien on its
homeowners' residences for unpaid assessments and fines.
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(1). Moreover, NRS 116.3116(2)
gives priority to that HOA lien over all other liens and
encumbrances with limited exceptions-such as “[a] first
security interest on the unit recorded before the date on
which the assessment sought to be enforced became
delinquent.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2)(b).
statute then carves out a partial exception to subparagraph
(2)(b)'s exception for first security interests.
See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2). In SFR
Investment Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, the Nevada Supreme Court
provided the following explanation:
As to first deeds of trust, NRS 116.3116(2) thus splits an
HOA lien into two pieces, a superpriority piece and a
subpriority piece. The superpriority piece, consisting of the
last nine months of unpaid HOA dues and maintenance and
nuisance-abatement charges, is “prior to” a first
deed of trust. The subpriority piece, consisting of all other
HOA fees or assessments, is subordinate to a first deed of
334 P.3d 408, 411 (Nev. 2014) (“SFR
116 of the Nevada Revised Statutes permits an HOA to enforce
its superpriority lien by nonjudicial foreclosure sale.
Id. at 415. Thus, “NRS 116.3116(2) provides an
HOA a true superpriority lien, proper foreclosure of which
will extinguish a first deed of trust.” Id. at
419; see also Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31162(1)
(providing that “the association may foreclose its lien
by sale” upon compliance with the statutory notice and
(1) of NRS 116.31166 provides that the recitals in a deed
made pursuant to NRS 116.31164 of the following are