United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is plaintiff Nationstar Mortgage LLC's
(“Nationstar”) motion for summary judgment. (ECF
No. 36). Defendants Springs Property Owners Association,
(“the HOA”) and SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC
(“SFR”) filed responses (ECF Nos. 38, 41), to
which plaintiff replied (ECF Nos. 42, 43).
before the court is defendant HOA's motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 33). Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No.
39), to which the HOA replied (ECF No. 44).
before the court is defendant SFR's motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 37). Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No.
40), to which SFR replied (ECF No. 45).
case involves a dispute over real property located at 1056
Chip Court, Minden, Nevada, 89705 (the
“property”). (ECF No. 1). On July 25, 2002,
Alberto Dacayanan, Jr., Samantha Dacayanan, Alberto
Dacayanan, and Adela Dacayanan purchased the property.
Id. The Dacayanans obtained a loan in the amount of
$352, 000 from Quicken Loans, Inc., to refinance ownership of
the property. Id. The loan was secured by a deed of
trust recorded on March 6, 2006. Id.; (ECF No.
36-1). The deed of trust lists Quicken Loans, Inc., as the
lender and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as
the beneficiary “solely as a nominee for Lender and
Lender's successors and assigns.” (ECF No. 36-1).
The covenants, conditions, and restrictions
(“CC&R”) governing the property contained a
mortgage protection clause. (ECF No. 36-11).
January 22, 2010, MERS assigned the deed of trust to HSBC
Bank USA, National Association, as trustee for Deutsche Alt-A
Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2006-AR6 (“HSBC”) via a
corporation assignment of deed of trust (recorded on January
28, 2010). Id.; (ECF No. 36-2). On November 18,
2014, HSBC assigned its interest in the deed of trust to
Nationstar via a corporate assignment of deed of trust
(recorded on December 1, 2014). (ECF No. 36-3).
Dacayanans stopped paying dues to the HOA. On April 20, 2011,
Phil Frink & Associates, Inc., acting on behalf of the
HOA, recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien, stating
an amount due of $1, 115.72. (ECF No. 36-4). On October 10,
2012, Kern & Associates, Ltd. (“Kern”),
acting on behalf of the HOA, recorded a notice of default and
election to sell to satisfy the delinquent assessment lien,
stating an amount due of $3, 055.09. (ECF No. 1); (ECF No.
November 6, 2013, Kern recorded a notice of homeowners
association sale, stating an amount due of $5, 874.51 and an
anticipated sale date of December 4, 2013. (ECF No. 1); (ECF
January 10, 2014, the HOA foreclosed on the property. (ECF
No. 1). The HOA purchased the property at the foreclosure
sale for $450. (ECF No. 1); (ECF No. 36-7). A foreclosure
deed in favor of the HOA was recorded on January 17, 2014.
Id.; (ECF No. 36-7).
April 14, 2014, the HOA transferred the property to SFR via a
quitclaim deed (recorded on April 18, 2014). (ECF No. 1);
(ECF No. 36-9). SFR paid $22, 500 to purchase the property.
(ECF No. 36-10).
August 24, 2016, Nationstar filed the underlying complaint,
alleging four causes of action: quiet title against all
defendants; breach of NRS 116.1113 against the HOA; wrongful
foreclosure against the HOA; and injunctive relief against
SFR. (ECF No. 1).
November 23, 2016, SFR filed its answer to the complaint.
(ECF No. 15). The answer includes crossclaims against the
Dacayanans, as well as counterclaims against Nationstar.
instant motions, plaintiff, defendant HOA, and defendant SFR
all move for summary judgment in their favor. (ECF Nos. 33,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy
its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary
judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must
come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of
proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its
burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an
essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2)
by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden,
summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159- 60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary
judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are
unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880
F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must
go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and
set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that
shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the
nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Id.
initial matter, the court takes judicial notice of the
following recorded documents: the first deed of trust (ECF
No. 36-1); the assignment to Nationstar; (ECF No. 36-3); the
notice of delinquent assessment (ECF No. 36-4); the notice of
default and election to sell (ECF No. 36-5); the notice of
trustee's sale (ECF No. 36-6); and the trustee's deed
upon sale (ECF No. 36-7). See, e.g., United
States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 998-99 (9th
Cir. 2011) (holding that a court may take judicial notice of
public records if the facts noticed are not subject to
reasonable dispute); Intri-Plex Tech., Inv. v. Crest
Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007).
Quiet title The court will first address the
parties' competing arguments regarding Nationstar's
claim for quiet title ...