United States District Court, D. Nevada
DAVID K. SCHULT, Petitioner,
BRIAN COX, et al., Respondents.
the court for a decision on the merits is an application for
a writ of habeas corpus filed by David K. Schult, a Nevada
prisoner. ECF No. 6.
January 2009, Schult was convicted, pursuant to jury
verdicts, of sexual assault with a minor under fourteen years
of age, lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen, and
child abuse and neglect. He was sentenced to twenty years to
life on the assault count, a concurrent term of ten years to
life on the lewdness count, and a consecutive term of 96 to
240 months on the child abuse count. Schult was further
sentenced to lifetime supervision and ordered to register as
a sex offender. The judgment of conviction was filed on April
filed a direct appeal. The judgment of conviction was
affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court on May 10, 2010. On
November 19, 2010, Schult filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the state district court. The court entered an
order denying relief on December 19, 2013. Schult appealed.
On January 15, 2015, the Nevada Supreme Court entered an
order affirming the lower court's denial of relief.
initiated this habeas proceeding in July 2015 and, on
September 5, 2015, filed the petition now before this court
for decision. In screening the petition under Habeas Rule 4,
the court concluded that Grounds One, Three, Four, Five, Six
and Seven of the petition fail to state a claim for which
habeas relief may be granted. ECF No. 7. Pursuant to
respondents' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13), the court
dismissed a portion of Ground Two. ECF No. 23.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the
standard of review under AEDPA:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim -
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly
established federal law if the state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite that reached by the Supreme Court on a
question of law or if the state court decides a case
differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable
application" occurs when "a state-court decision
unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the
facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409.
"[A] federal habeas court may not "issue the writ
simply because that court concludes in its independent
judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied
clearly established federal law erroneously or
incorrectly." Id. at 411.
Supreme Court has explained that "[a] federal
court's collateral review of a state-court decision must
be consistent with the respect due state courts in our
federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a
'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court
rulings, ' and 'demands that state-court decisions be
given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v.
Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v.
Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "A
state court's determination that a claim lacks merit
precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded
jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state
court's decision." Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court
has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does
not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was
unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)); see also Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (describing the
AEDPA standard as "a difficult to meet and highly
deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,
which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit
of the doubt") (internal quotation marks and citations
federal court may not second-guess a state court's
fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court
record, it determines that the state court was not merely
wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v.
Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004);
see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 ("[A]
decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based
on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual
grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the
evidence presented in the state-court proceeding, §
2254(d)(2)."). Because de novo review is more
favorable to the petitioner, federal courts can deny writs of