United States District Court, D. Nevada
M. Navarro, Chief Judge United States District Court.
before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of the
Honorable United States Magistrate Judge Peggy A. Leen, (ECF
No. 2079), denying Defendant Melvin D. Bundy
(“Bundy”) and Jason D. Woods'
(“Woods'”) Motions to Dismiss, (ECF Nos.
1880, 1961). Bundy timely filed his Objection, (ECF No.
2133), and the Government timely filed a Response, (ECF No.
2189). For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES
Bundy and Woods' Motions to Dismiss, (ECF Nos. 1880,
March 2, 2016, a federal grand jury sitting in the District
of Nevada returned a Superseding Indictment charging nineteen
defendants with sixteen counts related to a confrontation on
April 12, 2014, with Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”) Officers in Bunkerville, Nevada. (ECF No.
27). The underlying Motions seek to dismiss the charges
against Bundy and Woods on the basis of Speedy Trial
violations. (See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 1880,
1961). In her Report and Recommendation, Judge Leen rejected
these arguments and recommended denial of the Motions. (R.
& R. 6:6-7, ECF No. 2079).
the Motions were filed, Bundy and Woods remained in custody
and a firm trial date had not been set. (See Mot. to
Dismiss 3:17-27, ECF No. 1961); (see also Mot. to
Dismiss 2:19-21, ECF No. 1880). On December 4, 2017, the
Court ordered Bundy and Woods released on bond. (See
Mins. of Proceeding, ECF Nos. 2944, 2947). Presently, the
trial for both Defendants is set to begin on February 26,
2018. (See Order Regarding Trial, ECF No. 3132).
may file specific written objections to the findings and
recommendations of a United States Magistrate Judge made
pursuant to Local Rule IB 1-4. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B);
D. Nev. R. IB 3-2. Upon the filing of such objections, the
Court must make a de novo determination of those
portions of the Report to which objections are made.
Id. The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations of the
Magistrate Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); D. Nev. IB
Wood's Motion to Dismiss
party fails to object, the Court is not required to conduct
“any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the
subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140, 149 (1985). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has
recognized that a district court is not required to review a
magistrate judge's report and recommendation where no
objections have been filed. See, e.g., United
States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir.
2003). Woods has not filed an objection to the Report and
Recommendation, and the deadline to do so has passed.
Accordingly, Wood's Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 1961), is
Bundy's Motion to Dismiss
asserts two objections to Judge Leen's Report and
Recommendation denying his Motion to Dismiss. (Obj., ECF No.
2133). First, Bundy argues that Judge Leen “erred in
finding that [his] Motion to Dismiss on Speedy Trial grounds
advanced the same arguments previously denied in
codefendant's pleadings.” (Id. 4:24-25).
Specifically, Bundy argues that “each defendant's
speedy-trial claim in this case requires individual analysis
. . . [t]hus, the Magistrate Court erred by failing to
address the individualized arguments raised by [Bundy] in his
motion to dismiss.” (Id. 6:12, 6:22-24).
Second, Bundy contends that Judge Leen “erred in
finding that the previous exclusions of time under the Speedy
Trial Act justify the continuing violation of [his]
Constitutional right to a speedy trial, and that [his]
failure to object in writing to the Case Management and
Severance Orders allows for his continued detention.”
reviewed the record in this case de novo, the Court
agrees with the analysis and findings of Judge Leen in her
Report and Recommendation, (ECF No. 2079), denying
Bundy's Motion to Dismiss and incorporates them by
reference in this order. The Court finds that neither
Bundy's Motion to Dismiss nor his Objection provide
sufficient support for the extreme remedy requested.
Supreme Court has established a four-factor test to determine
challenges to a defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial
rights: (1) whether the delay was uncommonly long; (2)
whether the government or the defendant was responsible for
the delay; (3) whether the defendant has asserted his or her
right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the Defendant
suffered prejudice. Doggett v. United States, 505
U.S. 647, 651 (1992). This four-factor test was first
announced in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972),
which found that none of the four factors is “either a
necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a