Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

PennyMac Loan Services, LLC v. Townhouse Greens Association, Inc.

United States District Court, D. Nevada

February 6, 2018




         I. SUMMARY

         This case arises out of a homeowner association's (“HOA”) foreclosure under NRS Chapter 116. Pending before this Court is Defendant Thunder Properties, Inc.'s (“Thunder”) second Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) (ECF No. 63). Plaintiff Pennymac Loan Services, LLC (“Pennymac”) filed a response (ECF No. 69), and Thunder did not file a reply.

         For the reasons stated below, the Motion is denied.


         Pennymac initiated this action on August 8, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) In its complaint, Pennymac brings two claims against Thunder: one for quiet title and the other for injunctive relief. (ECF No. 1.) On June 6, 2017, this Court denied Thunder's first motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (ECF No. 21) and did not give Thunder leave to file a new motion. (ECF No. 52, 53.) Moreover, Thunder has not yet filed an answer to Pennymac's complaint.


         Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A properly pleaded complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Rule 8 notice pleading standard requires Plaintiff to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).

         In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 678. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. Second, a district court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged ― but it has not show[n] ― that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks omitted). When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Moreover, a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations concerning “all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Id. at 562 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1989)).


         The Motion raises four arguments: (1) Pennymac lacks standing to assert a violation of due process because it received actual notice of the HOA foreclosure sale; (2) Pennymac has failed to state a claim for quiet title because it did not possess any interest in the property at the time of the HOA foreclosure sale; (3) the fact that the Federal Housing Authority insured the first deed of trust (“DOT”) is irrelevant; and (4) the complaint's claim for permanent injunction is not a stand-alone claim and fails because Pennymac does not have a valid interest in the property. The Court will consider the first argument only.

         A. Untimeliness and Waiver

         The Court will not consider the second, third, and fourth arguments in the Motion for two reasons.

         First, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(4)(A) states that “if the court denies the motion [to dismiss] . . .the responsive pleading must be served within 14 days after notice of the court's action.” Here, no responsive pleading was filed by Thunder; instead, Thunder chose to file a new motion to dismiss, in which it raised arguments for the first time, more than two months after the Court denied its prior motion to dismiss.[1] ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.