United States District Court, D. Nevada
U.S.A. DAWGS, INC., Plaintiffs,
SPILOTRO LAW GROUP, LLC, Defendants.
ORDER (DOCKET NOS. 36, 37)
J. KOPPE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
before the Court is a stipulation for a settlement conference
and to reopen discovery. Docket Nos. 36, 37. The stipulation
is hereby DENIED without prejudice.
stipulation is procedurally defective. First, the local rules
prohibit the filing of documents seeking diverse types of
relief and, instead, a separate request must be filed for
each type of relief sought. Local Rule IC 2-2(b); see
also Docket No. 38. Second, the stipulation fails to
provide a signature line as required. Local Rule 7-1(e)
(incorporating form requirements from Local Rule IA
6-2). Third, the stipulation provides an
incorrect statement as to when requests for extensions must
be made, as they are due 21 days before the expiration of the
subject deadline(s) for which extension is sought and not 21
days before the discovery cutoff. Compare Local Rule
26-4 with Docket No. 36 at 7. This has already been
pointed out to the parties in this case. Docket No. 20 at 3
(rejecting and replacing portion of discovery
stipulation is substantively defective. Requests to reopen
expired deadlines in the scheduling order must be supported
by both “good cause” and “excusable
neglect.” See Local Rule 26-4; see
also Docket No. 26 at & n.1 (explaining the
applicable standards when a deadline has already expired).
The stipulation fails to address excusable neglect at all.
Such a shortcoming is especially problematic in situations,
like the one here, where discovery closed several months ago
and the case should be primed for trial. See Id. at
1-2 (establishing discovery cutoff of November 2, 2017, and
deadline to file joint proposed pretrial order of January 3,
respect to good cause, the stipulation indicates that it is
an “abstract term” for which “scant”
case law exists providing guidance. Docket No. 36 at 3. In
making this assertion, the parties ignore well-established
and binding Ninth Circuit case law providing a concrete
standard for “good cause” in the context of
requests to extend the deadlines in the scheduling order.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,
Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992); see also
Derosa v. Blood Sys., Inc., 2013 WL 3975764, at *1 &
n.1 (D. Nev. Aug. 1, 2013). Making matters worse, the
stipulation is not only internally inconsistent but also
contradicted by other representations in the record. The
stipulation indicates that “[t]he illness and injury
suffered by counsel for Defendant has essentially taken him
out of the office for almost five months.” Docket No.
36 at 6. Earlier in the stipulation, however, the parties
represent that counsel's medical procedure occurred
“in September of 2017 [and] took him effectively from
his office for approximately two weeks, ” and that the
“remainder of the discovery period” was spent
conferring over discovery disputes, dealing with issues of
service, and engaging in settlement discussions. Id.
at 2. Moreover, the parties represented to the
Court on October 4, 2017, that “discovery is
ongoing” and made no mention of counsel being unable to
conduct discovery due to a medical issue. Docket No. 30 at 2.
Hence, it appears that counsel was only sidelined for two
weeks as a result of the medical issue and that he was back
to work as of at least October 4, 2017 (or almost four months
before the pending stipulation was filed). No. showing has
been made that a two-week absence suffices to reopen
discovery at this late date.
reasons discussed above, the stipulation is
DENIED without prejudice. Any renewed
request shall be filed by February 12, 2018. Counsel shall
ensure that such request complies with all applicable rules.
Counsel shall also ensure that such request identifies and
addresses the applicable standards. Unless a renewed request
is filed and granted, the parties shall file a joint proposed
pretrial order by March 12, 2018.
 Although the filing is captioned as a
“joint motion, ” it is presented by all parties
remaining in the case and is, therefore, a stipulation.
See Local Rule 7-1(c).
 For example, the stipulation seeks to
reopen, inter alia, the deadline for expert
disclosures. Docket No. 36 at 6. Any request to extend that
deadline should have been filed by August 14, 2017.
Compare Docket No. 26 at 1 (setting deadline for
September 4, 2017) with Local Rule 26-4 (requests to