United States District Court, D. Nevada
MY HOME NOW, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company, Plaintiff,
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. a National Banking Corporation; U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR LSF9 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST, a National Banking Corporation; CALIBER HOME LOANS, INC., a South Carolina Corporation, Defendants.
M. NAVARRO, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No.
67), filed by Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(“Chase”). Plaintiff My Home Now, LLC
(“Plaintiff”) filed a Response, (ECF No. 70), and
Chase filed a Reply, (ECF No. 75).
pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment,
(ECF No. 68), filed by Plaintiff. Defendants Caliber Home
Loans, Inc. (“Caliber”) and U.S. Bank Trust, N.A.
(“U.S. Bank”) filed a Response, (ECF No. 69), and
Chase (collectively “Defendants”) also filed a
Response, (ECF No. 71). Plaintiff filed Replies, (ECF Nos.
pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment,
(ECF No. 79), filed by Defendants Caliber and U.S. Bank.
Plaintiff filed a Response, (ECF No. 81), and Caliber and
U.S. Bank filed a Reply, (ECF No. 82).
case arises out of the parties' disputed ownership of
real property located at 7555 Glowing Ember Court, Unit 101,
Las Vegas, Nevada, 89130, APN 125-27-219-013 (the
“Property”). (See Deed of Trust, Ex. A
to Chase's Mot. for Summ. J. (“MSJ”), ECF No.
67-1). Specifically, on September 18, 2008, John
MacArthur (“MacArthur”) purchased the Property
subject to a Deed of Trust with a loan obtained from Metlife
Home Loans, a Division of Metlife Bank, N.A.
(“Metlife”). (Id.). On January 5, 2012, a
Notice of Delinquent Assessment Lien was recorded against the
Property on behalf of Summerhills Condominiums Unit 1 (the
“HOA”) by Nevada Association Services, Inc. (the
“HOA Trustee”). (Not. of Delinquent Assessment,
Ex. 5 to U.S. Bank's Request for Jud. Notice, ECF No.
55-5). The Notice of Default and Election to Sell under the
Homeowners Association Lien was recorded against the Property
by the HOA Trustee on March 7, 2012. (Not. of Default, Ex. 6
to U.S. Bank's Request for Jud. Notice, ECF No. 55-6).
September 19, 2013, Metlife recorded a Corporate Assignment
of Deed of Trust where it assigned its interest under the
Deed of Trust to Chase. (Assignment to Chase, Ex. C to
Chase's MSJ, ECF No. 67-3). A Notice of the Foreclosure
Sale was recorded against the Property by the HOA Trustee on
April 10, 2014. (Not. of Foreclosure, Ex. 7 to U.S.
Bank's Request for Jud. Notice, ECF No. 55-7). On May 2,
2014, a non-judicial foreclosure sale occurred whereby
Suzannah R. Noonan and Anthony S. Noonan (“the
Noonans”) acquired interest in the Property; the
Noonans recorded this interest on May 5, 2014. (Foreclosure
Deed, Ex. 8 to U.S. Bank's Request for Jud. Notice, ECF
No. 55-8); (see Pl.'s MSJ ¶ 10, ECF No.
68). On June 18, 2014, the Property was sold to Plaintiff.
(Quitclaim Deed at 15-18, Ex. 9 to Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No.
October 6, 2014, Plaintiff filed a quiet title suit against
Chase and unnamed Does and Roes, which was later removed to
this District. (State Ct. Compl. at 21-30, Ex. 10 to
Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 68-2); (see My Home Now, LLC v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank N.A., et al, 2:14-cv-01958-APG-NJK)
(hereinafter the “Prior Action”). However, in
February 2015, Chase notified Plaintiff that it “held
title for a short period of time and then title was
reassigned.” (Plaintiff's Letter at 2, Ex. 11 to
Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 68-3) (hereinafter
“Plaintiff's Letter”). “This
conversation was memorialized by correspondence from
Plaintiff's counsel to Chase's counsel.”
(Pl.'s MSJ ¶ 26). Pursuant to this exchange, Chase
filed a Disclaimer of Interest (the “Disclaimer”)
in February 2015, disclaiming any legal or equitable interest
in the Property. (Disclaimer of Int. at 5-6, Ex. 12 to
Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 68-3). Because Chase filed the
Disclaimer, Plaintiff stipulated to dismiss its claims
against Chase on June 2, 2015. (Stip. of Dismissal at 8-9,
Ex. 13 to Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 68-3) (the
learning of Chase's assignment, but before issuing the
Stipulation, Plaintiff amended its Complaint to add MacArthur
as a party. (Plaintiff's Letter at 2). MacArthur failed
31, 2015, Chase recorded its previous assignment of interest
to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”), and HUD recorded its assignment of
interest to U.S. Bank on August 31, 2015. (See Chase
Assignment, Ex. 7 to Chase's MSJ, ECF No. 67-7); (HUD
Assignment, Ex. 10 to Chase's MSJ, ECF No. 67-10). These
recorded assignments were made public on September 23, 2015.
(Chase Assignment, Ex. 7 to Chase's MSJ); (HUD
Assignment, Ex. 10 to Chase's MSJ).
light of this, Plaintiff contacted Chase on October 9, 2015,
accusing Chase of committing slander of title by recording
its assignment to HUD after filing the Disclaimer.
(Plaintiff's Letter at 2). Notably, on the very same day
as it issued Plaintiff's Letter, Plaintiff then filed a
motion for entry of clerk's default against MacArthur.
(Mot. for Entry of Clerk's Default, Prior Action, ECF No.
30). After the Clerk entered default, Plaintiff filed a
motion for default judgment on October 21, 2015, which was
ultimately granted on November 25, 2015. (Default J., Prior
Action, ECF No. 33). The order granting default judgment held
that judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against
MacArthur and “any ROE ENTITY quieting title to [the
Property].” (Id. 5:25-26).
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint and Defendants removed
it to this Court on April 1, 2016. (See Pet. for
Removal, ECF No. 1). In its Complaint, Plaintiff alleges
claims of: (1) quiet title against all Defendants; (2)
slander of title against all Defendants; and (3) breach of
contract against Chase. (Pet. for Removal Ex. A
(“Compl.”), ¶¶ 21-52, ECF No. 1-1). On
April 26, 2016, Chase filed a motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 8),
which the Court granted, (ECF No. 58). In the Order, the
Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's quiet title
claim against Chase and provided Plaintiff leave to amend its
slander of title and breach of contract claims. (Order
5:23-6:6). Plaintiff filed its Amended Complaint, (ECF No.
59), on February 27, 2017.
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on March 29, 2017,
seeking judgment on Plaintiff's slander of title and
breach of contract claims. (See Chase's MSJ, ECF
No. 67). On that same day, Plaintiff filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment against Defendants for each cause of action.
(See Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 68). U.S. Bank and
Caliber filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on October
11, 2017, seeking summary judgment only on the quiet title
cause of action. (See U.S. Bank and Caliber's
MSJ, ECF No. 79).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary
adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the
case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine
if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Id.
“Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable
jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's
favor.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship,
521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999)). A
principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or
defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways:
(1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of
the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that
the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to
establish an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323- 24. If the
moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary
judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the
nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid
summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations
that are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v.
List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the
opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of
the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing
competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial.
See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is “to
be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn
in his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence
of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.
See Id. at 249-50.
instant action, all of the parties involved have filed cross
motions for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims.
Because of this, the Court will determine summary judgment on
each cause of action rather than on each of the parties'
Motions. The Court will therefore first address the quiet
title claim and then turn to the slander of title claim and
the breach of contract claim.
Quiet Title against ...