United States District Court, D. Nevada
J. Dawson, United States District Judge.
before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment (#45). Defendant Edward Kielty Trust filed a
response (#59) to which Plaintiff replied (#63). Also before
the Court is Defendant Edward Kielty Trust's Motion for
Summary Judgment (#46). Plaintiff filed a response (#58) to
which Defendant Edward Kielty Trust replied (#62). Also
before the Court is Defendant Hillcrest at Summit Hills
Homeowners Association's Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint (#71). Plaintiff filed a response (#74) to which
Defendant Hillcrest at Summit Hills Homeowners Association
replied (#76). Also before the Court is Defendant Hillcrest
at Summit Hills Homeowners Association's Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint (#73). Plaintiff filed a response
(#75) to which Defendant Hillcrest at Summit Hills Homeowners
Association replied (#77).
case emerges from Summit Hills Homeowners Association's
May 2013 non-judicial foreclosure sale of the property
located at 2216 Calm Sea Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89106
(“the Property”). All motions presently before
the Court center in whole or in part around the question of
what notice of default Summit Hills Homeowners Association
was required to provide Plaintiff prior to its foreclosure
sale on the Property.
April 21, 2017, in Bank of New York Mellon v. Star Hills
Homeowners Association, this Court certified the
following question to the Nevada Supreme Court:
“Whether NRS § 116.31168(1)'s incorporation of
NRS § 107.090 requires homeowners associations to
provide notices of default to banks even when a bank does not
request notice?” Bank of New York Mellon v. Star
Hill Homeowners Assoc., 2017 WL 1439671, at *5 (D. Nev.
April 21, 2017).
granting certification, the Court reasoned the following: In
Bourne Valley, the Ninth Circuit definitively
answered the question that the statute's
“opt-in” framework was unconstitutional.
Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA,
832 F.3d 1154, 1160 (2016). However, that leaves this Court
with the unresolved question of what notice must be provided.
“It is solely within the province of the state courts
to authoritatively construe state legislation.”
Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271
F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). As such, state law questions
of first impression like this one should be resolved by the
state's highest court. See Huddleston v. Dwyer,
322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944). Allowing the Nevada Supreme Court
to answer this question before considering any other motions
will provide this Court the necessary guidance as to how to
handle the issue of notice and actual notice in light of
Bank of New York Mellon, the Court did not and could
not rely upon any controlling state law as to the
requirements of notice. This Court faces the same predicament
here. An answer to the above already certified question will
provide much needed clarity, and may be dispositive of many
of the issues currently before the Court in this case.
Sua Sponte Stay of the Case
pending motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss
in this case implicate the previously certified question
regarding what notice state law requires. To save the parties
from the need to invest resources in discovery surrounding
the notice requirement, the Court sua sponte stays
all proceedings in this case and denies all pending motions
district court has the inherent power to stay cases to
control its docket and promote the efficient use of judicial
resources. Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248,
254-55 (1936); Dependable Highway Exp., Inc., v.
Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir.
2007). When determining whether a stay is appropriate pending
the resolution of another case - often called a
“Landis stay” - the district court must
weigh: (1) the possible damage that may result from a stay;
(2) any “hardship or inequity” that a party may
suffer if required to go forward; and (3) “the orderly
course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or
complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law”
that a stay will engender. Lockyer v. Mirant Corp.,
398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). Weighing these
considerations, the Court finds that a Landis stay
Damage from a stay
only potential damage that may result from a stay is that the
parties will have to wait longer for resolution of this case
and any motions that they have filed or intend to file in the
future. But a delay would also result from any rebriefing or
supplemental briefing that may be necessitated pending the
Nevada Supreme Court's answer to the ...