Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Mendez v. Fiesta Del Norte Home Owners Association

United States District Court, D. Nevada

January 16, 2018

IRMA MENDEZ, Plaintiff,
v.
FIESTA DEL NORTE HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION et al., Defendants.

          ORDER

          ROBERT C. JONES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This case arises out of a homeowners' association foreclosure sale. Pending before the Court are counter motions for summary judgment.

         I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         Plaintiff Irma Mendez, a California resident, purchased an investment property in North Las Vegas, Nevada (“the Property”) for $315, 000, giving the lender a promissory note for $252, 792 and an attendant deed of trust (“the DOT”) against the Property. Alessi & Koenig, LLC (“A&K”), on behalf of Fiesta Del Notre Homeowners Association (“the HOA”), sold the Property to Absolute Business Solutions, Inc. (“ABS”) under Nevada Revised Statutes (“NRS”) Chapter 116.

         Plaintiff sued A&K, the HOA, Complete Association Management Co., LLC (“CAMCO”), ABS, and Amir Hujjuttallah in diversity in this Court in pro se on eight causes of action: (1) wrongful foreclosure; (2) violations of constitutional rights; (3) Nevada Unfair Trade Practices Act (“NUTPA”); (4) Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”); (5) Fraud; (6) Unjust Enrichment; (7) Racketeering; and (8) Breach of Contract and Fiduciary Duties. CAMCO moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the HOA and A&K joined the motion. ABS and Hujjuttallah separately moved to dismiss under Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942), and the HOA joined the motion. The Court denied the second motion but granted the first motion in part, with leave to amend in part. Specifically, the Court dismissed the claims for unjust enrichment, racketeering, breach of fiduciary duty, and the claims under NRS sections 598.0915(1) and (15), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692f(6), 1692g(c), 1692i(b), and 1692k, without leave to amend. The Court dismissed the claim for fraud and the claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, and 1692j(a), with leave to amend. The Court refused to dismiss the claims for wrongful foreclosure and breach of contract and the claims under NRS section 598A.060(1)(12) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).

         Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), listing five causes of action: (1) wrongful foreclosure; (2) NUTPA; (3) FDCPA; (4) Fraud; and (5) Breach of Contract. CAMCO filed two motions to dismiss the FAC, and the HOA joined the first motion. A&K filed a separate motion to dismiss, which the HOA joined. The Court denied the motions as against the wrongful foreclosure claim, based on Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants wrongfully rejected her attempt to redeem the default before the foreclosure sale. The Court denied the motions as against the claim of bid rigging under NRS section 598A.060(1)(a)(12), based on Plaintiff's allegation that the foreclosure sale occurred in the private offices of the auctioneer for approximately 10% of the Property's fair market value. Plaintiff also alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692f, and 1692g. The Court dismissed the claims under §§ 1692d and 1692g and dismissed the § 1692f claim as against CAMCO but not as against the HOA or A&K. The Court dismissed the fraud claim. Finally, the Court permitted the breach of contract claim to proceed as against the HOA, based on Plaintiff's allegations that the HOA failed to obtain the consent of two thirds of unit owners in the HOA before pursuing foreclosure as required by the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (“the CC&R”).

         The Court granted a motion to amend the FAC in part, and Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), listing four causes of action: (1) wrongful foreclosure (the HOA, CAMCO, A&K, Absolute Collection Services, LLC (“ACS”)); (2) NUTPA bid rigging (A&K, Kendrall Williams, ABS, Hujjutallah); (3) FDCPA § 1692f (the HOA, A&K); and (4) Breach of Contract (the HOA). Plaintiff moved for offensive summary judgment on the FDCPA claim, and the HOA moved for defensive summary judgment against that claim. Three groups of Defendants and “indispensable parties” (as named in the SAC) separately moved to dismiss. The Court dismissed Williams, the Jimijack Irrevocable Trust, Joel and Sandra Stokes, and ACS from the action and granted summary judgment to the HOA against the FDCPA claim.

         In summary, the remaining claims are: (1) wrongful foreclosure (the HOA, CAMCO, A&K); (2) NUTPA bid rigging (A&K, ABS, Hujjutallah); (3) FDCPA § 1692f (A&K); and (4) Breach of Contract (the HOA).[1] A&K has filed for bankruptcy protection, so the action is presumably stayed as against A&K. The HOA and CAMCO have moved for defensive summary judgment against the wrongful foreclosure and breach of contract claims. Plaintiff has filed a countermotion for offensive summary judgment.

         II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

         A court must grant summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Id. A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

         In determining summary judgment, a court uses a burden-shifting scheme. The moving party must first satisfy its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24.

         If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by facts. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.

         At the summary judgment stage, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Id. at 249-50. Notably, facts are only viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party where there is a genuine dispute about those facts. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). That is, even if the underlying claim contains a reasonableness test, where a party's evidence is so clearly contradicted by the record as a whole that no reasonable jury could believe it, “a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

         III. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.