United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is defendant Specialized Loan Servicing
LLC's (“SLS”) motion to dismiss. (ECF No.
13). Plaintiff Becky Harris filed a response (ECF No. 17), to
which SLS replied (ECF No. 19).
a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) violation
action resulting from an alleged erroneous report containing
derogatory credit information issued to national reporting
agencies. (ECF No. 1 at 2).
about June 16, 2011, plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
(“bankruptcy”). (ECF No. 1 at 4). The bankruptcy
court discharged plaintiff's obligations on September 19,
2012. Id. Subsequent to the discharge, in an
Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”)
report dated May 27, 2015, SLS reported an account
“status” for plaintiff that included a
“balloon payment” of $32, 262, due in November of
2021. Id. at 6. Plaintiff disputed the reported
information by notifying Experian, in writing, in accordance
with 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2). Id. at 7. On or
about September 21, 2015, plaintiff received notification
from Experian that the account in question was
“[u]pdated, ” and that Experian had
“completed processing of [her] dispute(s).”
Id. Nonetheless, the challenged information was
re-reported on plaintiff's report. Id. at 8.
January 23, 2017, plaintiff filed the underlying complaint
against defendants SLS, Experian, and Nissan-Infiniti LT
(“Nissan”), alleging willfully inaccurate and
negative reporting of a discharged debt in violation of the
FCRA, 15 U.S.C §§ 1681s-2(b)(1)(D) and (E),
1681i(a) and/or 1681e(b). (ECF No. 1). On March 22, 2017, SLS
filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
(ECF No. 13).
April 12, 2017, while SLS's motion was still pending,
plaintiff voluntarily dismissed defendant Nissan from this
action, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). (ECF No.
18). Additionally, on August 22, 2017, plaintiff and
defendant Experian stipulated to a dismissal of
plaintiff's claims against Experian in accordance with
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). (ECF No. 32).
may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “[a]
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2);
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations, it demands “more than labels and
conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).
Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step
approach district courts are to apply when considering
motions to dismiss. First, the court must accept as true all
well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however,
legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of
truth. Id. at 678-79. Mere recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Id. at 678.
the court must consider whether the factual allegations in
the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief.
Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the
plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allow the court
to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678.
the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
“alleged-but not shown-that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). When the allegations in a complaint have not
crossed the line from conceivable to plausible,
plaintiff's claim must be dismissed. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570.
Ninth Circuit addressed post-Iqbal pleading
standards in Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th
Cir. 2011). The Starr court stated, in relevant
First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth,
allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply
recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain
sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair
notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
effectively. Second, the factual allegations that are taken
as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such
that it is not ...