United States District Court, D. Nevada
SPRINGLAND VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Nevada Non-Profit Cooperative Corporation, Plaintiff,
JENNIE M. PEARMAN, et al,, Defendants. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff,
DWIGHT CARLSON, Defendant, And related counterclaims.
MIRANDA DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before this Court is Federal National Mortgage
Association's (“Fannie Mae”) motion for
summary judgment in two related cases. (Lead Case, ECF
No. 28; Member Case, ECF No. 17.) In the Member Case, Pyramid
Tribe filed a response (ECF No. 18), and Fannie Mae filed a
reply (ECF No. 24). No. response was filed in the Lead Case.
For the following reasons, Fannie Mae's motion is
Dwight Carlson as Trustee for Pyramid Tribe TR-116
(“Pyramid Tribe”) purchased property
(“Property”) at a homeowner association
foreclosure sale (“HOA Sale”), which it contends
extinguished a deed of trust (“DOT”) then
encumbering the Property. (Main Case, ECF No. 28 at 2.) At
the time of the HOA Sale, Fannie Mae owned a loan secured by
the Property and was the record beneficiary of the associated
DOT. (Id.) In Fannie Mae's motion for summary
judgment, it contends that (1) the foreclosure sale could not
have extinguished the deed of trust due to the effect of 12
U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) (“Federal Foreclosure
Bar”) and (2) that Pyramid Tribe's claims for
unjust enrichment and equitable mortgage fail. (Lead Case,
ECF No. 28 at 9-14; Member Case, ECF No. 17 at 9-14.)
purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials
when there is no dispute as to the facts before the
court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't
of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there
is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable
fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute
is “material” if it could affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where reasonable
minds could differ on the material facts at issue, however,
summary judgment is not appropriate. See Id. at
250-51. “The amount of evidence necessary to raise a
genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to require a
jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions
of the truth at trial.'” Aydin Corp. v. Loral
Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting
First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253,
288-89 (1968)). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a
court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement
Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103
(9th Cir. 1986).
moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib.
Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the
moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden
shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The
nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the
pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through
affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the
dispute exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc.,
929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT &
SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's
position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252.
Mae contends that the Federal Foreclosure Bar protects its
DOT such that the DOT still encumbers the Property. Fannie
Mae further contends that Pyramid Tribe's counterclaims
fail as a matter of law.
Federal Foreclosure Bar
Federal Foreclosure Bar prohibits nonconsensual foreclosure
of Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”)
assets. Berezovsky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923, 925 (9th
Cir. 2017). As a result, the Federal Foreclosure Bar
generally protects Fannie Mae's property interests from
extinguishment if Fannie Mae was under FHFA's
conservatorship, possessed an enforceable property interest
at the time of the HOA Sale, and did not
consent to such extinguishment. See Id.
it is undisputed that Fannie Mae was placed into
conservatorship under FHFA in September 2008 and did not
consent to the HOA Sale extinguishing or foreclosing Fannie
Mae's interest in the Property. (Main Case, ECF No. 28 at
4, 6.) Fannie Mae acquired an enforceable property interest
in the Property on June 24, 2014, and continued to hold that
interest at the time of the HOA Sale on January 22, 2016.
(Id. at 5.) This is amply demonstrated in both the
public record and Fannie Mae's business records.
(See ECF No. 28-5 at 2; ECF No. 28-2 at 2-4; ECF No.
28-3 at 2-14).
Court finds that the Federal Foreclosure Bar protected Fannie
Mae's DOT from extinguishment given that Fannie Mae held
an enforceable interest in the Property at the time of the
HOA Sale, was under the conservatorship of FHFA at the time
of the HOA Sale, and did not consent to the HOA Sale
extinguishing or foreclosing Fannie Mae's interest in the
Property. Accordingly, the HOA Sale did not ...