petition for a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative,
mandamus challenging a district court order in a medical
Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP and Daniel F. Polsenberg, Joel
D. Henriod, Abraham G. Smith, and Erik J. Foley, Las Vegas;
John H. Cotton & Associates and John H. Cotton and
Katherine L. Turpen, Las Vegas, for Petitioner.
Murdock & Associates, Chtd., and Robert E. Murdock, Las
Vegas; Eckley M. Keach, Chtd., and Eckley M. Keach, Las
Vegas, for Real Party in Interest Madden Duda.
Seegmiller & Associates and Clark Seegmiller, Las Vegas,
for Real Parties in Interest Autumn Matesi and Robert Ansara,
as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mary Ann Haase.
HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and STIGLICH, JJ.
Chapter 41A.035 limits the liability of "provider[s] of
health care" by capping their damages in medical
malpractice actions to $350, 000 and abrogating joint and
several liability. The 2015 Legislature amended NRS 41A.017
to add physician assistants to the definition of
"[p]rovider of health care." Petitioner Jocelyn
Segovia, a physician assistant, is a defendant in a medical
malpractice action accruing before the 2015 amendments were
enacted. She petitions this court to determine whether the
amendment clarified the existing definition of a provider of
health care, so as to apply retroactively, or whether the
amended definition operates prospectively only. Because the
2015 amendments expressly apply "to a cause of action
that accrues on or after the effective date of this act,
" see 2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 439, § 11, at
2529; S.B. 292, 78th Leg. (Nev. 2015), and Segovia fails to
rebut the presumption that statutory amendments are applied
prospectively, we deny her writ petition.
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
February 2012, Mary Haase, mother of real party in interest
Madden Duda, saw Dr. George Michael Elkanich regarding pain
she was experiencing in her leg and back. Dr. Elkanich
diagnosed Haase with bilateral lower extremity radiculopathy
and recommended surgery. Dr, Elkanich chose physician
assistant Jocelyn Segovia to assist in the procedure. The
surgery took place on March 5, 2012, at Valley Hospital.
During the surgery, Dr. Elkanich and/or Segovia allegedly
tore, sliced, or punctured Haase's aorta, causing
substantial blood loss and a drop in blood pressure.
According to the coroner's report, Haase died mid-surgery
from a laceration to her aorta and the ensuing blood loss.
Duda, along with real parties in interest Autumn Matesi and
Robert Ansara, as special administrator of Haase's Estate
(collectively, Duda), subsequently initiated a medical
malpractice action. Duda moved for summary judgment as to
Jocelyn Segovia. The motion sought to have the district court
determine that Segovia was not a "[p]rovider of health
care" per NRS 41A.017, and thus, not entitled to NRS
Chapter 4lA's abrogation of joint and several liability
or the damages cap of $350, 000. The district court granted
Duda's motion, finding that Segovia was not entitled to
the protections of NRS Chapter 41A because the language of
NRS 41A.017 in effect at the time of the surgery did not
cover physician assistants, and the subsequent 2015 amendment
to the statute adding physician assistants only applies
prospectively. Segovia then petitioned this court to answer
the question of whether physician assistants are entitled to
the statutory protections of NRS Chapter 41A for causes of
action accruing before the effective date of the 2015
seeks relief in the form of a writ of prohibition or, in the
alternative, mandamus. "This court has original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and
prohibition." MountainView Hosp., Inc. v. Eighth
Judicial Dist Court, 128 Nev. 180, 184, 273 P.3d 861,
864 (2012); Nev. Const, art. 6, § 4. "A writ of
prohibition is appropriate when a district court acts without
or in excess of its jurisdiction." Cote H. v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 P.3d 906, 907
(2008). "A writ of mandamus is available to compel the
performance of an act which the law requires as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station, or to control a
manifest abuse or an arbitrary or capricious exercise of
discretion." Id. at 39, 175 P.3d at 907-08
(alteration, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted).
a writ petition seeks an extraordinary remedy, this court has
discretion whether to consider such a petition. Cheung v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,121 Nev. 867, 869, 124 P.3d
550, 552 (2005). Extraordinary writ relief may be available
where there is no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law." NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330;
Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist
Court,124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008).
However, despite an available legal remedy, this court may
still entertain a petition for writ "relief where the