United States District Court, D. Nevada
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR NEW CENTURY HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST, SERIES 2005-C, ASSET BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, Plaintiff,
LEMMIE GARNER, SUSAN CARLILE, and WOODLAND VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Defendants. LEMMIE GARNER and SUSAN CARLILE, Counterclaimants,
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR NEW CENTURY HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST, SERIES 2005-C, ASSET BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, Counter-defendant.
R. HICKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter centers on a nonjudicial foreclosure of a Nevada
property by a homeowners' association. The foreclosure
sale was conducted under Nevada Revised Statute
(“N.R.S.”) § 116.3116 et seq. in
2014. After the foreclosure sale, the Ninth
Circuit struck down the notice scheme of N.R.S. §
116.3116 et seq. as facially unconstitutional.
Bourne Valley Court Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 832
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct.
2296 (2017). As a result, plaintiff Deutsche Bank National
Trust company brought this action against the homeowners'
association that foreclosed on the property, defendant
Woodland Village Homeowner's Association, as well as the
purchasers at the foreclosure sale, defendants Lemmie Garner
and Susan Carlile.
matter now brings five motions before the court: (1) Deutsche
Bank's motion to dismiss Garner and Carlile's
counterclaim for fraud, ECF No. 11; (2) Woodland
Village's motion to dismiss the complaint, ECF No. 13;
(3) Deutsche Bank's motion for summary judgment based on
the allegedly statutorily defective foreclosure sale, ECF No.
22; (4) Woodland Village's motion for summary judgment,
ECF Nos. 23, 26 (Errata to ECF No. 23); and (5) Deutsche
Bank's motion for summary judgment based on the
unconstitutionality of N.R.S. § 116.3116 et
seq., ECF No. 24.
court first grants Deutsche Bank's motion to dismiss
Garner and Carlile's counterclaim for fraud, finding the
allegations fail to allege fraud with the required degree of
particularity. The court then denies Woodland Village's
motion to dismiss, finding the complaint survives the
standards of both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6). Finally, under the guidance of binding
authority from the Ninth Circuit, the court grants Deutsche
Bank's summary judgment motion regarding the
unconstitutionality of N.R.S. § 116.3116 et
seq., denies Woodland Village's competing summary
judgment motion, and denies Deutsche Bank's remaining
summary judgment motion as moot.
2004, John Davis and Kim Davis purchased property located at
18101 Alexandria Drive, Reno, NV 89506. ECF No. 25, Ex.
1; ECF No. 23 at 2; ECF No. 22 at 3. The two executed a deed
of trust in relation to the property in 2005. ECF No. 25, Ex.
2. The deed of trust identified Home123 Corporation as the
beneficiary and Western Title as the trustee. Id. It
was recorded in Washoe County, Nevada. Id. By way of
assignment, Deutsche Bank came to hold the beneficial
interests under the deed of trust as a trustee. Id.,
property sits in a community governed by a homeowners'
association, Woodland Village. Woodland Village began the
foreclosure process on the property by filing a notice of
delinquent assessment lien in 2011. Id., Ex. 4.
Woodland Village then recorded a notice of default and
election to sell in 2013, which was followed shortly
thereafter by a notice of trustee's sale. Id.,
Exs. 5-6. Garner and Carlile purchased the property at the
foreclosure sale in 2014. Id., Ex. 7.
the foreclosure sale, Deutsche Bank brought this action
against Garner, Carlile, and Woodland Village, asserting five
claims for relief: (1) quiet title and declaratory relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, N.R.S. § 30.010 et
seq., and N.R.S. § 40.010; (2) declaratory relief
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution; (3) quiet title under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; (4) permanent and
preliminary injunction; and (5) unjust enrichment. ECF No. 1.
Deutsche Bank asserts the third, fourth, and fifth claim
against Garner and Carlile only. Id. Garner and
Carlile answered the complaint and asserted three counter
claims: (1) quiet title; (2) unjust enrichment; and (3)
fraud. ECF No. 9.
motions to dismiss have been filed. First, Deutsche Bank
moves to dismiss the counterclaim for fraud. ECF No. 11. No
opposition was filed. Second, Woodland Village moves to
dismiss the complaint. ECF No. 13. Deutsche Bank opposed the
motion, and Woodland Village filed a reply. ECF Nos. 15, 16.
addition to the two motions to dismiss, the parties filed
competing motions for summary judgment. Deutsche Bank moves
for summary judgment on two bases. First, it moves for
summary judgment regarding the allegedly statutorily
defective foreclosure sale and requests the court to take
judicial notice of eleven exhibits for the motion. ECF Nos.
22, 25. Two oppositions were filed, one by the Garner and
Carlile and one by Woodland Village. ECF Nos. 29, 32.
Deutsche Bank replied. ECF Nos. 35, 39. Second, Deutsche Bank
moves for summary judgment based on the alleged
unconstitutionality of N.R.S. § 116.3116 et
seq. ECF No. 24. Two oppositions were filed again, one
by Garner and Carlile and one by Woodland Village. ECF Nos.
29, 33. Deutsche Bank replied to both oppositions. ECF Nos.
35, 39. Woodland Village also moves for summary judgment. ECF
No. 23; see also ECF No. 26 (Errata to ECF No.
23). An opposition and a reply was filed. ECF Nos.
Deutsche Bank filed a notice of completion of mediation
pursuant to N.R.S. § 38.310. ECF No. 21.
order looks to four legal standards:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
may seek the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a legally cognizable cause of action.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, a complaint must satisfy the notice
pleading standard of Federal Rule 8(a)(2). See Mendiondo
v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th
Cir. 2008). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) does not require detailed factual
allegations; however, a pleading that offers only
“‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action'” is insufficient and fails to meet this
broad pleading standard. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To sufficiently
allege a claim under Rule 8(a)(2), viewed within the context
of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility when the
pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference, based on the court's judicial
experience and common sense, that the defendant is liable for
the alleged misconduct. See Id. at 678-679 (stating
that “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a
probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a
complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.”) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Further, in reviewing a motion to dismiss, the
court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as
true. Id. However, bare assertions in a complaint
amounting “to nothing more than a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a . . . claim . . . are not entitled to an
assumption of truth.” Moss v. U.S. Secret
Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 698) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court discounts these allegations because
“they do nothing more than state a legal
conclusion-even if that conclusion is cast in the form of a
factual allegation.” Id. “In sum, for a
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory
‘factual content, ' and reasonable inferences from
that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim
entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
9(b) requires a party to “state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Under the heightened pleading standard, a
plaintiff must “plead the ‘who, what, when,
where, and how' of the alleged misconduct” when
claiming fraud. Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
544 F. App'x 696, 698 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Vess
v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 10197, 1106 (9th Cir.
Federal Rule of Civil ...