United States District Court, D. Nevada
ORDER MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 37),
MOTION TO REDACT OPPOSITION AND SEAL EXHIBIT (ECF NO. 43),
ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR FRCP 56(D) RELIEF (ECF NO.
FERENBACH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is Defendants Officers Krook and Chandler's
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 37), Plaintiff Aprintess
Williams' motion to redact his opposition to the motion
for summary judgment and seal Exhibit 5 (ECF No. 43), and
Plaintiff's alternative request for Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d)
relief (ECF No. 45). For the reasons discussed below, the
Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants'
motion for summary judgment, grants Plaintiff's motion to
redact and seal, and denies as moot Plaintiff's request
for Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d) relief.
amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts that officers working
for the Department of Parole and Probation violated his
constitutional rights and intentionally inflicted emotional
distress on him. (ECF No. 13 at 1-2, 6). Plaintiff alleges
that during a parole appointment in June 2016, officers drove
him “around Las Vegas for…five (5) hours in
handcuffs, without food or water.” (Id. at 2,
4). Officers searched Plaintiff's safe deposit box at a
bank, a friend's residence that Plaintiff has access to,
and Plaintiff's home. (Id. at 4-5). During this,
“Plaintiff told the officers he did not feel well and
demanded he be taken to the Clark County Detention Center,
” specifically stating “his shoulders were
numb.” (Id. at 5). “Plaintiff was never
allowed water despite complaining of being hot, uncomfortable
and not feeling well.” (Id. at 6). Plaintiff
eventually passed out. (Id.). After being taken to a
hospital, Plaintiff “was diagnosed with having heat
stroke.” (Id.). Plaintiff asserts he has
suffered “humiliation, anxiety and a loss of
sleep” as a result of the officers' actions.
(Id. at 7).
September 20, 2017, Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 37). Defendants argue they are entitled to
qualified immunity because “[t]here is no clearly
established case law that indicates a simple complaint of not
feeling well, absent anything else, requires an officer to
jump to immediately fulfill the transportation desires of the
inmate beyond their intended route.” (Id. at
3-4). Defendants point out that Plaintiff's amended
complaint fails to identify which specific constitutional
right was violated. (Id. at 5). Defendants assert
that Plaintiff cannot establish that the officers “were
deliberatively indifferent to his medical needs” under
the Eighth Amendment because “[n]othing indicates that
Defendants knew of any risk to Plaintiff's health or that
he disregarded that risk by failing to take any
action.” (Id. at 6). Defendants also argue
that “Plaintiff waived his Fourth Amendment rights as a
condition of his parole. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment
cannot be the basis of his alleged constitutional violation
claim.” (Id. at 7). Defendants finally assert
that there is no evidence to support Plaintiff's
intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”) claim because the officers' conduct
was not sufficiently outrageous and Plaintiff did not suffer
compensable emotional distress. (Id. at 9).
October 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed a response. (ECF No. 40).
Plaintiff argues the motion for summary judgment is
“devoid of facts and any admissible evidence”
because “discovery is still open, ” including the
deposition of the Defendants. (Id. at 1). Attached
to Plaintiff's response is Plaintiff's declaration,
which adds depth to the amended complaint. (ECF No. 40-2).
Plaintiff states he asked for water multiple times during the
incident, the “air conditioning, if any” in the
car “was insufficient to cool [him] down, ” and
at one point the Defendants drank ice cold water in front of
Plaintiff and refused to give him any. (Id. at 2-4).
Plaintiff asserts Defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity because Plaintiff's right to medical care is
well-established and the officers clearly violated that
right. (ECF No. 40 at 14-15). Plaintiff argues there is, at
minimum, a material factual dispute regarding Plaintiff's
medical indifference claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
because dehydration and nerve damage are objectively serious
medical complaint and officers ignored Plaintiff's
numerous complaints. (Id. at 8-14). Plaintiff also
asserts questions of fact remain regarding his IIED claim.
(Id. at 17). Plaintiff finally argues questions of
fact remain regarding whether officer violated his Fourth
Amendment right because the parole agreement attached to the
motion for summary judgment was not authenticated.
(Id. at 17-18; ECF No. 42). In the alternative to
denying the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff asks that
any ruling on the motion be continued for further discovery
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). (ECF No. 45 at 18-19). Plaintiff
also moves to seal and redact portions of his response
relating to his health information, including Exhibit 5
attached to the response (ECF No. 40-5). (ECF No. 43).
October 26, 2017, Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 46).
Defendants asserts the qualified immunity question is ripe
for determination because it is a question of law and
“[n]o amount of fact discovery will make a difference
regarding Defendants' legal immunity from suit.”
(Id. at 2). Discussing the parties' disagreement
over whether the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment applies to
Plaintiff's medical indifference claim, Defendants state
“the fact that there is even disagreement regarding the
appropriate standard underscores the deficiency of
Plaintiff's claim.” (Id. at 3). Defendants
question Plaintiff's declaration, stating that
“surely” the facts must have been different, and
argue that because the declaration has “not been
subject to cross-examination or greater scrutiny, therefore
[it] ought not to be considered at face value but a desperate
attempt to avoid summary judgment.” (Id. at
5-6). Attached to the reply is a declaration authenticating
the parole agreement. (ECF No. 46-1).
Court held a hearing on December 18, 2017. (ECF No. 55). At
the hearing, Plaintiff's counsel stated the
authentication of the parole agreement was no longer in
dispute. Defense counsel also conceded that Defendant did not
have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation
regarding the search of Defendant's friend's
TO REDACT AND SEAL
court recognizes that the need to protect medical privacy has
qualified as a ‘compelling reason, ' for sealing
records in connection with a dispositive motion.”
Williams v. Nevada Dep't of Corr., No.
2:13-CV-941-JAD-VCF, 2014 WL 3734287, at *1 (D. Nev. July 29,
2014). In addition, Defendants did not file an opposition to
Plaintiff's motion, and “[t]he failure of an
opposing party to include points and authorities in response
to any motion constitutes a consent to granting the
motion.” LCR 47-3.
Court grants Plaintiff's motion to redact his opposition
and seal Exhibit 5 to the extent that they discuss
Plaintiff's medical history. Plaintiff's opposition
was docketed three separate times as ECF Nos. 40, 41, and 45.
ECF Nos. 40 and 45 were not filed under seal. They have been
redacted and Exhibit 5 was omitted from the attachments with
the indication that it would be filed under seal. ECF No. 41
was filed under seal. It is unredacted and Exhibit 5 is
included. Therefore, ECF No. 41 will remain under seal in
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). At summary judgment, the court's role
is not to weigh the evidence, make credibility
determinations, or determine the truth. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
“Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”
Zetwick v. Cty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir.
2017) (quoting United States v. JP Morgan Chase Bank
Account No. Ending 8215, 835 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir.
2016)). “The district court must not only properly
consider the record on summary judgment, but must consider
that record in light of the governing law.”
Id. at 442 (internal citation omitted).