United States District Court, D. Nevada
JOSHUA ABRAMS, an individual; PRESTON FORTNEY, an individual; NOE LUNA, an individual; SALESH JATAN, an individual; NANCI WIRTH, an individual; ADAM YOUNG, an individual; EMERIO BENAVIDES, an individual; JEFFREY SHARP, an individual; ANA HLEDIK, an individual; and FE HLEDIK, an individual, all on behalf of themselves and all similarly-situated individuals, Plaintiffs,
PEPPERMILL CASINOS, INC., a Nevada corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendant.
MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before this Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration of Order Denying Remand (“Motion to
Reconsider”) (ECF No. 17) and Defendant Peppermill
Casinos, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”)
(ECF No. 18). The Court has reviewed the parties'
responses (ECF Nos. 20, 22), replies (ECF Nos. 21, 23), and
Plaintiffs' accompanying exhibit to their Motion to
Reconsider (ECF No. 19-1).
reasons discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiffs'
Motion to Reconsider and grants in part Defendant's MTD.
their amended class action complaint (“FAC”),
Plaintiffs advance two claims against Defendant: (1)
violation of Nevada's Minimum Wage Amendment
(“MWA” or “the Amendment”) and (2)
violation of NRS § 608.1555. As to their first claim,
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant has violated the MWA by
failing to provide qualified health benefit plans consistent
with NRS § 608.1555, which states that “[a]ny
employer who provides benefits for health care to his or her
employees shall provide the same benefits and pay providers
of health care in the same manner as a policy of insurance
pursuant to chapters 689A and 690B of NRS.” (ECF No.
1-2 at ¶¶ 73-75, 88-89; see also ECF No.
17 at 3 (“it is true that Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant has violated the Amendment by failing to provide
the same benefits and pay providers of health care in the
same manner as a policy of insurance pursuant to NRS Chapters
689A and 689B”) (internal quotation marks omitted).)
Simultaneously, Plaintiffs' second claim contends that
Defendant's proffered health care benefits do not meet
the requirements of NRS Chapters 689A and 689B and,
therefore, that Defendant has violated NRS § 608.1555.
(ECF No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 93-94.)
Court's prior order (ECF No. 16), it denied
Plaintiffs' motion to remand (ECF No. 7), finding that
complete preemption under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”), applied to
Plaintiffs' second claim because NRS § 608.1555
“clearly relates” to an ERISA-regulated plan.
(ECF No. 16 at 5.) The Court also found that Plaintiffs'
reading of the MWA requires this Court “to determine
whether the benefits provided by Defendant fail to satisfy
the requirements under NRS Chapters 689A and 689B, ”
which is the second claim for relief as well as the legal
theory advanced in support of the first claim for relief.
(Id. at 6.) Because “state causes of action
that ‘duplicate or fall within the scope of an ERISA
§ 502(a) remedy' are completely preempted and hence
removable to federal court, ” Aetna Health Inc. v.
Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 206 (2004) (quoting Roark v.
Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 305 (2002)) (internal
alterations omitted), the Court found removal of
Plaintiffs' second claim for violation of NRS §
608.1555 to be proper. The Court then chose to extend
supplemental jurisdiction to Plaintiffs' first claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). (ECF No. 16 at 6.)
Plaintiffs now move for reconsideration of that order.
MOTION TO RECONSIDER (ECF No. 17) 
argue that, in the Court's order denying their motion to
remand, the Court misconstrued the allegations of the FAC
because Plaintiffs “do not allege that Defendant must
provide particular benefits to [Plaintiffs]” or that
Defendant has failed to provide a “precise health
benefit plan . . . as promised, ” and also contend that
they “could not have brought [their second claim] under
§ 502(a) of ERISA.” (ECF No. 17 at 3,
The Court disagrees and finds that it did not misconstrue the
allegations in the FAC.
may relieve a party from a final judgment, order or
proceeding only in the following circumstances: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b);
see also De Saracho v. Custom Food Mach., Inc., 206
F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the district
court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion).
motion for reconsideration must set forth the following: (1)
some valid reason why the court should revisit its prior
order; and (2) facts or law of a “strongly convincing
nature” in support of reversing the prior decision.
Frasure v. United States, 256 F.Supp.2d 1180, 1183
(D. Nev. 2003). Motions for reconsideration are not
“the proper vehicle for rehashing old arguments,
” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holmes, 846
F.Supp. 1310, 1316 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (footnote omitted), and
are not “intended to give an unhappy litigant one
additional chance to sway the judge.” Durkin v.
Taylor, 444 F.Supp. 879, 889 (E.D. Va. 1977).
Motion to Reconsider and accompanying reply, as well as
Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendant's MTD, make clear
that Plaintiffs have misunderstood the meaning of NRS §
608.1555 in arguing that their second claim is not preempted
by ERISA. For that reason, the Court clarifies its
prior order by focusing exclusively on the statute's
meaning-which applies only where there is an ERISA health
care plan-so that it may elucidate why Plaintiffs' second
claim is preempted.
NRS § 608.1555
Nevada, an employer has three choices: (1) provide no health
insurance planto its employees; (2) provide a health
insurance plan to its employees by purchasing a policy
through a commercial insurance company; or (3) create its
own health care plan for its employees,  which may or may
not be administered by an entity separate from the employer.
NRS § 608.1555 applies to the third category. Thus,
based on the plain language of NRS § 608.1555 and the
legislative history behind that statutory provision, the
Court construed the second claim of the FAC to allege that
Defendant acts as an insurer by providing a self-funded
health care plan to its employees and that Defendant's
plan fails to provide the benefits outlined in NRS Chapters
689A and/or 689B.
interpreting a statute, a court's “starting point
is the plain language of the statute” itself.
United States v. Williams, 659 F.3d 1223, 1225 (9th
Cir. 2011). If a statute is unambiguous on its face, then
that meaning controls and a court need look no further.
Children's Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. Belshe,
188 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if a
statute's meaning is not plain, a court may look to the
legislative intent behind the statute. See Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 217 F.3d
1246, 1251 (9th Cir. 2000). As noted, NRS § 608.1555
states that, “Any employer who provides benefits for
health care to his or her employees shall provide the same
benefits and pay providers of health care in the same manner
as a policy of insurance pursuant to chapters 689A and 689B
of NRS.” Because the statute's use of
“provides” may be ambiguous as to the fashion in
which an employer provides its employees with health care