under NRAP 4(c) from a judgment of convietion, pursuant to
guilty plea, of burglary, two counts of robbery, coercion,
two counts of burglary while in possession of a deadly
weapon, two counts of robbery with use of a deadly weapon,
attempted burglary, and possession of a firearm by ex-felon.
Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Valerie Adair,
J. Schwartzer, Las Vegas, for Appellant.
Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B.
Wolfson, District Attorney, and Jonathan VanBoskerck, Chief
Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.
DOUGLAS, GIBBONS and PICKERING, JJ.
Troy Lee Mullner appeals his convictions for burglary,
robbery, coercion, burglary while in possession of a deadly
weapon, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, attempted
burglary, and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. We
Sentence as an Habitual Criminal
argues that the district court should not have considered his
prior conviction from 1984 in sentencing him as an habitual
criminal because the conviction is stale and stems from an
offense he committed as a minor. Mullner also asks this court
to adopt a rule prohibiting a district court from considering
juvenile offenses charged up to adult convictions in habitual
criminal sentencing, a rule he contends is supported by
State v. Javier C., 128 Nev. 536, 289 P.3d 1194
(2012). We review a trial court's adjudication of a
defendant as an habitual criminal under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. See Sessions u. State,
106 Nev. 186, 190, 789 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1990).
Previous Convictions Were Not Stale
district court may disregard prior convictions that are
stale, trivial, or where habitual criminal adjudication
"would not serve the purposes of the statute or the
interests of justice." Id. at 190, 789 P.2d at
1244 (quoting French v. State, 98 Nev. 235, 237, 645
P.2d 440, 441 (1982)) (reversing habitual criminal conviction
where a defendant's prior felony convictions were 23 to
30 years old and for non-violent crimes). Mullner's three
prior convictions span a period of 30 years, and are all for
violent crimes. Further, Mullner's oldest convictions
were for burglary and robbery, the same offenses he most
recently committed. Thus, unlike Sessions,
Milliner's prior convictions indicate he is a
"career criminal[ ] who pose[s] a serious threat to
public safety." Id. at 191, 789 P.2d at 1245.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in rejecting Mullner's argument that his 1984 conviction
was too stale to use for habitual criminal sentencing.
Prior Conviction Resulting From an Offense Committed as a
Minor Could Be Used for Habitual Criminal Sentencing
district court did not abuse its discretion in using
Mullner's charged-up conviction for habitual criminal
sentencing. When a juvenile is convicted and sentenced as an
adult, that conviction can enhance a defendant's
punishment as an habitual criminal, provided the court had
general jurisdiction to sentence the juvenile as an adult. 24
C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused
§ 2462 (2016); see also United States v.
Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 455-61 (6th Cir. 2010) (juvenile
conduct for which the accused was charged and sentenced as an
adult used as a prior felony for third strike); Womack v.
State, Docket No. 61127 (Order of Affirmance, February
13, 2013) (prior felony conviction committed as a juvenile
used for habitual criminal sentencing).
argument that our decision in State v. Javier C.
supports a rule prohibiting the use of such convictions in
habitual criminal sentencing is unpersuasive. In Javier
C, the court held that the criminal statute for battery
committed by a prisoner, NES 200.48 l(2)(f), did not apply to
an adjudicated juvenile delinquent because he was not a
"prisoner" under the definition of NRS 193.022,
which requires custody in the criminal context, and neither
juvenile justice proceedings nor a delinquent adjudication
are criminal in nature. 128 Nev. at 539-41, 289 P.3d at
1196-97. Here, the habitual criminal statute applies to a
defendant previously convicted of "[a]ny felony, "
without regard for whether the conviction could have been
(but was not) pursued as a juvenile offense. NRS
207.010(1)(b). A statute's plain meaning controls its
interpretation, see Bergna v. State, 120 Nev. 869,
873, 102 P.3d 549, 551 (2004), and we find no ambiguity in
the habitual criminal statute that would support reading it
as Mullner asks us to do. Accordingly, we decline to adopt a
ruling prohibiting a district court from considering felony
convictions originating from juvenile offenses in habitual
s Sentence Does Not Violate ...