prescreening of an appeal from a district court order entered
after a decree of divorce. Eighth Judicial District Court,
Family Court Division, Clark County; Bill Henderson, Judge.
Yu, Las Vegas, in Pro Se.
Rourong Yu, Las Vegas, in Pro Se.
HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and STIGLICH, JJ.
an appeal from a district court order ruling on several
post-judgment issues and declaring the parties to be
vexatious litigants. We consider whether the post-judgment
vexatious litigant determination, which is not independently
appealable, Peck v. Crouser, 129 Nev. 120, 124, 295
P.3d 586, 588 (2013), may be considered in this appeal or
must be challenged via an original writ petition. We conclude
that a post-judgment vexatious litigant determination may be
considered in an appeal from an otherwise appealable order,
and thus allow this appeal to proceed.
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Brian Yu and respondent Rourong Yu were divorced via a decree
entered in 2015. Thereafter, Brian filed several motions to
reopen the decree and alter its terms. The district court
entered an order that, among other things, denied Brian's
requests, granted Rourong an additional $88, 000 from certain
accounts, and declared both Brian and Rourong to be vexatious
litigants. Brian timely appealed.
court entered an order directing Brian to show cause why this
appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We
questioned whether the portion of the order declaring Brian
to be a vexatious litigant was appealable where no statute or
court rule appeared to authorize an appeal from such an
order. See NRAP 3A(b) (listing
appealable orders); Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 100 Nev. 207, 209, 678 P.2d 1152, 1153 (1984)
(stating that this court has jurisdiction to consider an
appeal only when the appeal is authorized by statute or court
rule); see also Jones v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 130 Nev. 493, 497, 330 P.3d 475, 478 (2014)
(noting that a petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper
means to challenge an order restricting a litigant's
access to the courts). Brian filed a response arguing that
orders resolving a "mixed bag" of issues, some of
which are reviewable through an appeal and some through a
writ petition, should be reviewable in their entirety via an
appeal. He asserts that requiring litigants to
file both an appeal and a writ petition from the same order
is contrary to Nevada's public policy of promoting
judicial economy by avoiding piecemeal review. He also
suggests that such a requirement could result in confusion.
Finally, Brian points to Lewis v. Lewis, 132 Nev.,
Adv. Op. 46, 373 P.3d 878 (2016), in support of his assertion
that an appeal is the proper method to challenge an order
containing a "mixed bag" of issues.
post-judgment order declaring a party to be a vexatious
litigant is not appealable and may only be challenged via an
original writ petition. Peck, 129 Nev. at 124, 295
P.3d at 588. The question here is whether litigants who seek
to challenge a post-judgment vexatious litigant determination
contained within an otherwise appealable order must file an
original writ petition to challenge the vexatious litigant
determination. We conclude they need not.
agree with Brian that requiring litigants to file both a
notice of appeal and an original writ petition to challenge
different portions of the same order is inconsistent with
Nevada's "interest in promoting judicial economy by
avoiding the specter of piecemeal appellate review."
Barbara Ann Hollier Tr. v. Shack, 131 Nev., Adv. Op.
59, 356 P.3d 1085, 1090 (2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Such a requirement could also cause unnecessary
confusion for attorneys and pro se litigants seeking this
court's review. Thus, allowing consideration of a
post-judgment vexatious litigant determination in an appeal
from an otherwise appealable order both promotes judicial
efficiency and simplifies the review process. Cf. Winston
Prods. Co. v. DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 526, 134 F.3d 726,
732 (2006) j (interpreting NRAP 4(a)(4) in such a manner as
to avoid piecemeal litigation and confusion regarding the
time for filing a notice of appeal).
review of a post-judgment vexatious litigant determination on
appeal from an otherwise independently appealable order is
also consistent with our recent decision in Vaile v.
Vaile, 133 Nev., Adv. Op. 30, 396 P.3d 791 (2017). In
that case, the appellant challenged a post-judgment order
concerning both child support and contempt. Id. at
794-95. Although a contempt order is not independently
appealable, Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners
Ass'n,116 Nev. 646, 649, 5 P.3d 569, 571 (2000), we
concluded that we had jurisdiction to consider a contempt
finding or sanction on appeal, so long as it "is
included in an order that is otherwise independently
appealable." Vaile, 133 Nev., Adv. Op. 30, 396
P.3d at 794-95; see also Lewis, 132 Nev., Adv. Op.
46, 373 P.3d at 881 (considering a challenge to contempt
findings in an appeal from a post-judgment order modifying