United States District Court, D. Nevada
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, and FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Plaintiffs,
TYROLIAN VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., and AIRMOTIVE INVESTMENTS LLC, Defendants. AIRMOTIVE INVESTMENTS LLC, Counterclaimant,
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, and FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Counter-Defendants.
R. HICKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter centers on a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The
foreclosure sale was conducted under Nevada Revised Statute
(“N.R.S.”) § 116.3116 et seq. in
2014. See ECF Nos. 38, 41, 45. After the foreclosure
sale, the Ninth Circuit struck down the notice scheme
employed by N.R.S. § 116.3116 et seq. as
facially unconstitutional. Bourne Valley Court Tr. v.
Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 832 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 2296 (2017). As a result,
plaintiffs Federal National Mortgage Association
(“Fannie Mae”) and Nationstar Mortgage LLC
(“Nationstar”) brought this action, seeking
declaratory relief and an order to quiet title. ECF No. 13.
two motions come before the court. First, defendant Tyrolian
Village Association, Inc. (“Tyrolian”) moves to
dismiss Fannie Mae and Nationstar's complaint. ECF No.
23. Fannie Mae and Nationstar opposed the motion, and
Tyrolian filed a reply. ECF Nos. 34, 37. Second, Fannie Mae
and Nationstar moved for partial summary judgment on their
declaratory-judgment claim and their quiet-title claim, both
of which were brought under the U.S. Constitution. ECF No.
38. Defendant Airmotive Investments, LLC
(“Airmotive”) opposed the motion. ECF No. 45.
Tyrolian also opposed the motion but in a limited manner. ECF
No. 41. Fannie Mae and Nationstar filed a reply to both
oppositions. ECFS No. 44, 46. To resolve the two motions, the
court turns to Bourne Valley-a Ninth Circuit opinion
that binds the court in its decision. Under the guidance of
Bourne Valley, the court grants Fannie Mae and
Nationstar's motion for partial summary judgment as to
the quiet-title claim and denies Tyrolian's motion as
2004, Gloria Brimm obtained a loan from CMG Mortgage, Inc. to
purchase a property located at 1364 Carinthia Court, Incline
Village, Nevada 89451. ECF No. 38, Ex. A. This transaction
gave rise to the first deed of trust on the property, which
was recorded in Washoe County, Nevada. Id. The deed
of trust designated Mortgage Electronic Registration
Services, Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficiary.
Id. In 2013, MERS assigned the deed of trust to
Nationstar. ECF No. 38, Ex. B.
at-issue property sits in a community governed by a
homeowners' association (Tyrolian) and is therefore
subject to HOA assessments. See ECF No. 38, Ex. A;
see Id. at 3; see ECF No. 45 at 4-6. After
Brimm failed to pay the assessments as they came due,
Tyrolian recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien. ECF
No. 38, Ex. C; ECF No. 45 at 6. When the delinquent
assessments remained unpaid, Tyrolian recorded a notice of
default and election to sell. ECF No. 38, Ex. D; ECF No. 45
at 6. Still, the delinquent assessments remained unpaid,
prompting Tyrolian to record a notice of foreclosure sale.
ECF No. 38, Ex. E; ECF No. 45 at 6. At the nonjudicial
foreclosure sale held in July 2014, TBR I, LLC (a non-party)
purchased the property. ECF No. 38, Ex. F; ECF No. 45 at 6-7.
Airmotive then purchased the property from TBR. ECF No. 38,
Ex. G; ECF No. 45 at 7.
Mae and Nationstar brought this action after the foreclosure
sale, alleging eight causes of action: (1) declaratory relief
under 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3); (2) quiet title under 12
U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3); (3) declaratory relief under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (4)
quiet title under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution; (5) declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201, N.R.S. § 40.010, and N.R.S. § 30.040
et seq.; (6) breach of N.R.S. § 116.1113; (7)
wrongful foreclosure; and (8) injunctive relief. ECF No. 13.
Airmotive brought two counterclaims: (1) quiet title and
declaratory relief and (2) negligent or intentional
misrepresentation. ECF No. 30. Airmotive asserts its second
counterclaim solely against Nationstar. Id.
now moves to dismiss the complaint in part. ECF No. 23.
Additionally, Fannie Mae and Nationstar move for partial
summary judgment, requesting the court to apply Bourne
Valley to their quiet-title claim and their
declaratory-judgment claim. ECF No. 38.
judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations, admissions, and other materials in the record
show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In assessing a motion for
summary judgment, the evidence, together with all inferences
that can reasonably be drawn therefrom, must be read in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); County of Tuolumne v. Sonora
Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001).
moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court
of the basis for its motion, along with evidence showing the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On those
issues for which it bears the burden of proof, the moving
party must make a showing that is “sufficient for the
court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find
other than for the moving party.” Calderone v.
United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986);
see also Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F.Supp.2d
1129, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
successfully rebut a motion for summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must point to facts supported by the record
which demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Reese
v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736 (9th Cir.
2000). A “material fact” is a fact “that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where reasonable minds could differ on
the material facts at issue, summary judgment is not
appropriate. See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th
Cir. 1983). A dispute regarding a material fact is considered
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. The mere existence
of a scintilla of evidence in support of the party's
position is insufficient to establish a genuine dispute;
there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find
for the party. See Id. at 252.
court addresses three arguments to resolve the summary
judgment motion. First, the court considers the effect of
Bourne Valley. Second, the court determines whether
to apply the “return doctrine.” Finally, the
court resolves the quiet-title claim brought under the U.S.
Constitution. But because Bourne Valley is