from a district court order denying a petition to set aside
an arbitration order. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; Nancy Becker, Senior Judge.
T. Kennedy, Las Vegas, for Appellant.
Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Clark G. Leslie, Chief Deputy
Attorney General, Carson City; D. Randall Gilmer, Senior
Deputy District Attorney, Las Vegas, for Respondent.
TAO and GIBBONS, JJ. 
principal legal question addressed in this appeal is whether
certain provisions of NRS Chapter 289 (namely, NRS 289.040,
289.057 and 289.060), intended to provide job-related
protections to peace officers employed by law enforcement
agencies, apply to bailiffs and marshals employed by the
Eighth Judicial District Court. We conclude that judicial
marshals are "peace officers" within the meaning of
those statutes, but the Eighth Judicial District Court is not
a "law enforcement agency" as statutorily defined.
Accordingly, the provisions at issue do not apply to
Knickmeyer, and we affirm the district court's denial of
his petition to set aside the arbitration award in this case.
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Eighth Judicial District Court (EJDC) employed Thomas
Knickmeyer first as a bailiff, and then later as an
administrative marshal. Knickmeyer's employment was
governed by the terms of a written Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between the Clark County Marshal's
Union and the EJDC which stipulated that adverse employment
actions, including possible termination, were to be resolved
through a series of administrative proceedings, eventually
culminating in a binding arbitration hearing if necessary.
EJDC sought to terminate Knickmeyer's employment after
co-workers reported several incidents of insubordination,
vulgar language, and unprofessional behavior. The allegations
included reports that Knickmeyer used foul language in the
presence of a co-worker, publicly referred to an attorney who
had complained about him as a "bitch, " and
retaliated against her by ordering that her purse be searched
and re-scanned even after being told it contained no
suspicious items. He also openly used an obscenity to refer
to a superior officer. In seeking termination, the EJDC noted
that Knickmeyer had previously been subject to lesser
disciplinary actions in 1997, 2003, and 2013.
the various administrative proceedings below, every hearing
officer agreed that termination was appropriate and
warranted. Knickmeyer appealed each step as outlined in the
MOU, ultimately seeking arbitration. The arbitrator upheld
the EJDC's decision to terminate Knickmeyer, finding that
a preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that Knickmeyer
committed the infractions in question and that termination
was an appropriate response. The arbitrator's decision
specifically noted that his conclusion was based only upon
the immediate incidents at stake and not upon the previous
complaints from 1997, 2003, or 2013.
petitioned the district court to set aside the
arbitrator's decision, arguing that the EJDC violated his
statutory rights under NRS Chapter 289 by improperly
disclosing and relying upon his prior disciplinary history as
justification for termination in this case. The district
court denied the petition, and Knickmeyer appeals, repeating
the same arguments made to the district court.
court reviews a district court decision to confirm an
arbitration award de novo. Thomas v. City of N. Las
Vegas, 122 Nev. 82, 97, 127 P.3d 1057, 1067 (2006). But
the scope of the district court's review of an
arbitration award (and, consequently, our own de novo review
of the district court's decision) is extremely limited,
and is "nothing like the scope of an appellate
court's review of a trial court's decision."
Health Plan of Nev,, Inc. v. Rainbow Med., LLC, 120
Nev. 689, 695, 100 P.3d 172, 176 (2004). "A reviewing
court should not concern itself with the
'correctness' of an arbitration award and thus does
not review the merits of the dispute." Bohlmann v.
Printz, 120 Nev. 543, 547, 96 P.3d 1155, 1158 (2004)
(quoting Thompson v. Tega-Rand Int'l, 740 F.2d
762, 763 (9th Cir. 1984)), overruled on other grounds by
Bass-Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 452 n.32, 134 P.3d
103, 109 n.32 (2006).
when a contractual agreement mandates that disputes be
resolved through binding arbitration, courts give
considerable deference to the arbitrator's decision.
Judicial review is limited to inquiring only whether a
petitioner has proven, clearly and convincingly, that one of
the following is true: the arbitrator's actions were
arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by the agreement; the
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law; or one of the
specific statutory grounds set forth in NRS 38.241(1) was
met. Clark ...