United States District Court, D. Nevada
ORDER (DEF.'S MOTION TO DISMISS - ECF NO.
MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is Defendant Desert Canyon Homeowners'
Association's (“Desert Canyon” or
“HOA”) motion to dismiss (“Motion”)
(ECF No. 8). The Court has reviewed Plaintiff Bank of
America, N.A.'s response (ECF No. 17) and Desert
Canyon's reply (ECF No. 18). Defendant SFR Investments
Pool 1, LLC (“SFR”) filed an untimely response
(ECF No. 22) to which Desert Canyon replied (ECF No. 26). The
Court agrees with Desert Canyon that the Court should
disregard SFR's response as the Motion addresses only
Plaintiff's claims against Desert Canyon.
following facts are taken from the Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) In
August 2008, Timothy and Adrian A. Goering
(“Borrowers”) obtained a loan
(“Loan”) in the amount of $226, 395.00 evidenced
by a note and secured by a deed of trust (“DOT”)
on property located in Desert Canyon (“the
Property”). Plaintiff subsequently acquired the Loan.
August 9, 2012, Desert Canyon recorded a notice of default
and election to sell to satisfy the delinquent assessment
lien. On January 7, 2013, Desert Canyon recorded a notice of
trustee's sale, which listed the amount due to the HOA as
$4, 063.84. Plaintiff's predecessor attempted to remit
payment to Desert Canyon to satisfy the super-priority amount
owed to the HOA. However, Desert Canyon foreclosed on the
Property on March 12, 2013. A trustee's deed upon sale in
favor of SFR was recorded on March 14, 2013. SFR paid $10,
asserts three claims against the HOA-quiet title/declaratory
relief, breach of NRS § 116.1113, and wrongful
may dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A properly pleaded complaint must
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not
require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than
“labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual
allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step
approach district courts are to apply when considering
motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as
true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint;
however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption
of truth. Id. at 678. Mere recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Id. at 678. Second, a
district court must consider whether the factual allegations
in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief.
Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the
plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allow a court to
draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678. Where the
complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
“alleged-but it has not show[n]-that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). When the claims
in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to
plausible, the complaint must be dismissed. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Canyon argues that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred or,
in the alternative, subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
(ECF No. 8 at 3-10.) The Court agrees that two of
Plaintiff's claims-breach of NRS § 116.1113 and
wrongful foreclosure-are time-barred. The Court finds that
Plaintiff states a claim for quiet title and declaratory
Statute of Limitations
Canyon argues that Plaintiff's claims accrued at the time
of the foreclosure sale. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff
counters that it only realized its injury when the Nevada
Supreme Court decided SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S.
Bank, N.A.,334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014), clarifying that
the foreclosure sale on a homeowner's association lien
extinguishes a first deed of trust. (ECF No. 17 at 5.)
However, this Court has held that a cause of action accrues
at the time of the foreclosure sale in homeowner's
association foreclosure cases such as this. See Goldsmith
Enterprises, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No.