from a district court order adjudicating an attorneys lien
and entering judgment for attorney fees. Eighth Judicial
District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; T.
Arthur Ritchie, Jr., Judge.
Patricia A. Marr, Henderson, for Appellant.
Carman Price and Corinne M. Price and Frances-Ann Fine,
Henderson, for Respondent. 
THE COURT EN BANC.
18.015 provides for the enforcement of liens for attorney
fees. In this appeal, we clarify that NRS 18.015, as amended
in 2013, provides for the enforcement of a retaining lien for
attorney fees. Because respondent met the statutory
requirements for the enforcement of a retaining lien, we
affirm the district court's order adjudicating an
attorney's lien and entering judgment for attorney fees.
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Carman Price (Fine) represented Kristi Rae Fredianelli in a
paternity action. After the district court issued its final
order in the paternity action, Fine filed a notice of
withdrawal as attorney of record. Fine subsequently filed and
served a notice of a retaining lien against Fredianelli for
$13, 701.82, of unpaid legal fees.
moved the district court to adjudicate the rights of counsel,
for enforcement of attorney's lien, and for a judgment
for attorney fees. Fredianelli opposed the motion.
Fredianelli did not dispute the amount of the attorney fees
but argued that Fine was asserting a charging lien, not a
retaining lien. Reiving solely on Leventhal v. Black
& LoBello, 129 Nev. 472, 305 P.3d 907 (2013),
Fredianelli claimed that the purported charging lien failed
as a matter of law. The district court granted Fine's
motion and awarded Fine $13, 701.82, plus interest and
district court did not err by enforcing Fine's retaining
lien against Fredianelli under NRS 18.015
appeal, Fredianelli concedes that the lien at issue is a
retaining lien, not a charging lien. She nevertheless argues
that the district court erred by enforcing Fine's lien
because, under NRS 18.015 and our caselaw interpreting it:
(1) a retaining lien is a passive lien that cannot be
enforced by an attorney, (2) there was no affirmative
recovery in the paternity action to which a lien could
attach, and (3) a retaining lien cannot be reduced to a
monetary judgment. We disagree.
18.015 governs attorney liens, and the parties' arguments
require us to interpret the Legislature's 2013 amendments
to NRS 18.015. "This court reviews a district
court's interpretation of a statute . . . de novo."
Marquis & Aurbach v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 122 Nev. 1147, 1156, 146 P.3d 1130, 1136 (2006).
"When interpreting a statutory provision, this court
looks first to the plain language of the statute."
Clay v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 445,
451, 305 P.3d 898, 902 (2013). If the statute is unambiguous,
this court does not "look beyond the statute itself when
determining its meaning." Westpark Owners'
Ass'n v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 349,
357, 167 P.3d 421, 427 (2007).
to 2013, NRS 18.015 only provided rules regarding enforcement
of "charging lien[s], " or liens "against the
client's claim or recovery." See Leventhal,
129 Nev. at 475, 305 P.3d at 909. Retaining liens were solely
"established at common law" and "allow[ed] a
discharged attorney to withhold the client's file and
other property until the court. . . adjudicate[d] the
client's rights and obligations with respect to the
lien." Argentena Consol. Mining Co. v. Jolley Urga
Wirth Woodbury & Standish, 125 Nev. 527, 532, 216
P.3d 779, 782 (2009). Retaining liens were considered a
"passive lien, " meaning that they could not
"be actively enforced by the attorney in judicial
proceedings." Id. at 533, 216 P.3d at 783.
2013, however, amendments made to NRS 18.015 provide a method
for attorneys to actively enforce retaining liens "[i]n
any civil action, upon any file or other property properly
left in the possession of the attorney by a client." NRS
18.015(1)(b). The amount of attorney fees subject to the
retaining lien must be the fee "agreed upon, " or
"[i]n the absence of an agreement... a reasonable fee
for the services ... rendered." NRS 18.015(2). The lien
must be "perfect[ed], " which means that the
attorney "serv[ed] notice in writing, in person or by
certified mail, return receipt requested, upon his or her
client[, ] . . . [and] claim[ed] the lien and stat[ed] the
amount of the lien." NRS 18.015(3). NRS 18.015(4)(b)
provides for the timing with which the lien
"attaches" to the property: a retaining lien
"attaches to any file or other property properly left in
the possession of the attorney by his or her client, . . .
from the time of service of the notices required by this
above requirements are met, NRS 18.015 then requires the
attorney to file a motion for ...