United States District Court, D. Nevada
ORDER (PL.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - ECF
MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant PNC Bank, N.A.'s
(“PNC Bank”) Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
63.) The Court has reviewed Defendant/Third- Party Plaintiff
Wingfield Springs Community Association's
(“Homeowner Association” or “HOA”)
response (ECF No. 66), Defendant/Counter-Claimant William Won
Holdings, LLC's (“Won Holdings”) joinder (ECF
No. 71), and Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant's reply (ECF No.
72). Oral argument was held on August 23, 2017. (ECF No. 77.)
Court grants in part and denies in part summary judgment for
the reasons discussed below.
facts below are taken from the HOA's statement of
undisputed facts (ECF No. 66) unless otherwise indicated.
couple, Gordon and Michelle Johnson, purchased a home in
Sparks (the “Property”) that is part of a
homeowners' association called the Wingfield Springs
Community Association in 2007. The Johnsons entered into two
loan agreements at the time of purchase. The first was with
Elegen Home Lending, LP (“Elegen”) in the amount
of $263, 520.00, and the deed of trust securing the loan was
recorded against the Property on March 26, 2007 (the
“First Deed of Trust”). The second was with
National City Bank, N.A. in the amount of $32, 940.00, and
the deed of trust securing the loan was recorded against the
Property on March 26, 2007 (the “Second Deed of
Trust”). Plaintiff PNC Bank now holds the beneficial
interest in both the First Deed of Trust and Second Deed of
Trust after various assignments and mergers. (See
ECF no. 63 at 2.)
Johnsons failed to pay HOA assessments, and the HOA
eventually foreclosed on the Property pursuant to NRS §
116.3116 et seq. in May 2013. Won Holdings purchased
the property at the sale for $3, 545.00. Plaintiff PNC Bank
filed suit seeking to quiet title and obtain declaratory
relief. (ECF No. 63.)
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). An issue is genuine “if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party, ” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and a dispute is
material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law. Id.
judgment is not appropriate when “reasonable minds
could differ as to the import of the evidence.” See
Id. at 250-51. “The amount of evidence necessary
to raise a genuine issue of material fact is [that which is]
enough ‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the
parties' differing versions of the truth at
trial.'” Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718
F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l
Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89
(1968)). Decisions granting or denying summary judgment are
made in light of the purpose of summary judgment: “to
avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the
facts before the court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n
v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th
moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib.
Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the
moving party satisfies the requirements of Rule 56, the
burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. In
evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts
and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d 805, 810
(9th Cir. 2008). If a party relies on an affidavit or
declaration to support or oppose a motion, it “must be
made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or
declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). The nonmoving party
“may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must
produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible
discovery material, to show that the dispute exists, ”
Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th
Cir. 1991), and “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 783
(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient . . .
.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
moves for summary judgment on its quiet title, declaratory
relief, and unconstitutional statute claims as well as on Won
Holdings' quiet title and attorney's fees
counterclaims. (ECF No. 63 at 2.) Plaintiff argues that the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Bourne
Valley Court Tr v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA,832 F.3d 1154
(9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,137 S.Ct. 2296
(2017), requires this Court to declare that the HOA
foreclosure sale did not extinguish Plaintiff's First
Deed of Trust ...