United States District Court, D. Nevada
GOLDSMITH ENTERPRISES, LLC., a Nevada limited liability company, Plaintiff,
U.S. BANK, N.A., DOES I through X and ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES I through X, inclusive, Defendants. U.S. BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2005-8, MORTGAGE LOAN PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-8, Counterclaimant,
GOLDSMITH ENTERPRISES LLC., Counterclaim-Defendant.
ORDER (DEF.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - ECF
MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is Defendant/Counterclaimant U.S. Bank, N.A.'s
(“U.S. Bank”) Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Motion”). (ECF No. 29.) The Court has reviewed
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant Goldsmith Enterprises
LLC's (“Goldsmith”) response (ECF No. 31) and
U.S. Bank's reply (ECF No. 32). The Court also heard
argument on the Motion on August 23, 2017. (ECF No. 36.)
reasons set out below, the Motion is granted in part and
denied in part.
following facts are taken from U.S. Bank's statement of
undisputed facts. (ECF No. 29.)
McMahon bought real property within a homeowner association
(“HOA”) located at 10616 Mountain Stream Ct., Las
Vegas, NV 89129 in 2005. Ms. McMahon financed the purchase
through a loan in the amount of $220, 800.00 secured by a
deed of trust (“First Deed of Trust”) dated June
2, 2005. MERS assigned the note and First Deed of Trust to
U.S. Bank on or about May 17, 2011.
McMahon failed to pay HOA assessments, and the HOA foreclosed
on the property pursuant to state statute in a foreclosure
auction on June 12, 2012. The HOA purchased the property at the
auction for $4, 900.00. The HOA transferred the property to
Nevada New Builds, LLC via quitclaim deed dated July 23, 2014
in exchange for $9, 250.52. Nevada New Builds, LLC then
transferred the property to Goldsmith via a “deed of
sale” dated March 25, 2015 in exchange for $78, 000.00.
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). An issue is genuine “if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party, ” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and a dispute is
material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law. Id.
judgment is not appropriate when “reasonable minds
could differ as to the import of the evidence.” See
Id. at 250-51. “The amount of evidence necessary
to raise a genuine issue of material fact is [that which is]
enough ‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the
parties' differing versions of the truth at
trial.'” Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718
F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l
Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89
(1968)). Decisions granting or denying summary judgment are
made in light of the purpose of summary judgment: “to
avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the
facts before the court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n
v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th
moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib.
Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the
moving party satisfies the requirements of Rule 56, the
burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. In
evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts
and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d 805, 810
(9th Cir. 2008). If a party relies on an affidavit or
declaration to support or oppose a motion, it “must be
made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or
declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). The nonmoving party
“may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must
produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible
discovery material, to show that the dispute exists, ”
Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th
Cir. 1991), and “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 783
(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient
. . . .” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Bank moves for summary judgment on its quiet title and
injunctive relief counterclaims as well as on Goldsmith's
quiet title, cancellation of instruments, and injunctive
relief claims. (ECF No. 29 at 1.) U.S. Bank argues that the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Bourne
Valley Court Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 832 F.3d 1154
(9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,137 S.Ct. 2296
(2017), requires this Court to declare that the HOA
foreclosure sale did not extinguish U.S. Bank's First
Deed of Trust because the sale was conducted under an
unconstitutional statute. (Id. at 8.) Goldsmith
argues that Bourne Valley does not bind this Court
(ECF No. 31 at 3); that U.S. Bank lacks ...