United States District Court, D. Nevada
M. NAVARRO, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
before the Court is the Motion for Relief from Judgment, (ECF
No. 46), filed by pro se Plaintiff Joseph Chidi
Anoruo (“Plaintiff”). Defendant Robert A. McDonald
and Defendant Joseph Moody (collectively
“Defendants”) each filed a Response, (ECF Nos.
47, 48), and Plaintiff filed a Reply, (ECF No. 49). For the
reasons discussed herein, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's
initiated this action following a decision by the Department
of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) to close VA
neighborhood outpatient clinics in Las Vegas, NV, and
consolidate these services at the Las Vegas VA Medical
Center. (Compl., ECF No. 4). Plaintiff's main grievance
was the failure of the VA and his union, the American
Federation of Government Employees Local 1224
(“AFGE”), to negotiate properly and adequately
address his concerns regarding the pharmacy consolidations.
(Id. 3:4-6, 13:19-14:21). Based on this failure,
inter alia, Plaintiff brought claims under the
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute
(“FSLMRS”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7106(b)(2)-(3),
and Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6120-6127. (Id.
December 5, 2016, the Court dismissed this action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 44). In the instant
Motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its prior
Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
Rule 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final
judgment, order or proceeding only in the following
circumstances: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud;
(4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment;
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.
Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1387 (9th Cir.
1985). “Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must be requested
within a reasonable time, and is available only under
extraordinary circumstances.” Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir.
1981) (internal citations omitted).
motion for reconsideration must set forth the following: (1)
some valid reason why the court should revisit its prior
order; and (2) facts or law of a “strongly convincing
nature” in support of reversing the prior decision.
Frasure v. United States, 256 F.Supp.2d 1180, 1183
(D. Nev. 2003). However, a motion for reconsideration is not
a mechanism for re-arguing issues presented in the original
filings, Backlund, 778 F.2d at 1388, or
“advancing theories of the case that could have been
presented earlier, Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holmes,
846 F.Supp. 1310, 1316 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (footnotes omitted).
See also Soto-Padro v. Pub. Bldgs. Auth., 675 F.3d
1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[A] party cannot use a [motion
for reconsideration] to rehash arguments previously rejected
or to raise ones that could, and should, have been made
before the judgment issued.”) (internal quotations
omitted). In other words, the purpose of Rules 59(e) and
60(b) is not “to give an unhappy litigant one
additional chance to sway the judge.” Durkin v.
Taylor, 444 F.Supp. 879, 889 (E.D. Va. 1977).
instant Motion, Plaintiff argues that the Court
“erroneously determined that all [of]
plaintiff[‘s] claims were premised only on
‘unfair labor practice'  and barred by
CSRA.” (Mot. for Relief 6:5-8, ECF No. 46).
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the Court erroneously
“excluded AFGE as a defendant.” (Id.).
Based on these alleged errors, Plaintiff asserts that the
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint.
response, Defendants note that Plaintiff's mere
disagreement with the Court's Order does not constitute
valid reasons of a ‘strongly convincing nature' to
reverse the Court's decision. (McDonald Resp. 2:22-23,
ECF No. 47; Moody Resp. at 3, ECF No. 48). Defendants are
correct. A motion for reconsideration should not be
“used to ask the Court to rethink what it has already
thought.” Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech.
Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 (D. Ariz. 2003);
see also Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388
(9th Cir. 1985).
explained in the previous Order, a Court must look to the
true nature of an action in determining whether jurisdiction
exists. See Teitelbaum v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 953 F.Supp. 326, 329 (D. Nev. 1996). Based
on this principle, the Court found that Plaintiff's
claims were premised on unfair labor practices under the CSRA
and therefore outside the Court's jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff's Motion cites to various federal
statutes and the United States Constitution in an attempt to
invoke this Court's federal question jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331. (See Mot. for Relief 9:5-10).
The Court has already rejected this argument. (Order 5:22-23,
ECF No. 44) (“While Plaintiff references several other
statutes and constitutional provisions in his Complaint,
these assertions do not provide separate causes of
action.”). Furthermore, the Court has already rejected
Plaintiff's argument concerning AFGE. (Id.
2:23-25) (“Plaintiff did not name AFGE as a defendant
in his complaint or amended complaint . . . [a]s such, AFGE
is not currently a party to this action.”). Having
reviewed the record in this case, the Court can discern no
reason to depart from its prior Order. Plaintiffs Motion
is therefore DENIED.
IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Relief