United States District Court, D. Nevada
C. JONES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
and Fred Mesi obtained a loan from Washington Mutual Bank for
$280, 334, secured by a deed of trust. The property was later
transferred to Betty and Fred Mesi. The deed of trust was
transferred to Bank of America. On February 4, 2014,
Plaintiffs sued Defendants in Nevada state court for wrongful
foreclosure, declaratory relief, unfair business practices,
and to quiet title and cancel instruments. On October 13,
2015, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint which asserted
various violations of state and federal law. Defendant JP
Morgan Chase Bank ("Chase") removed. The Court
granted Defendants' motions to dismiss, with leave to
amend in part no later than April 9, 2016, and denied
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs
appealed without amending, and the Ninth Circuit dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. In June 2016, after the mandate
issued, the Court denied a motion to reconsider that had been
filed and fully briefed in the meantime. In July 2017, after
more than a year with no filings by any party, the Court
closed the case and entered judgment in favor of Defendants.
now move to "dismiss the judgment and reopen the
case." (ECF Nos. 69, 70.) Although Chase has interpreted
Plaintiffs request as a motion for reconsideration,
Plaintiffs' motion actually cites Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(4), concerning void judgments, as a basis for
the relief sought. Regardless of how the motion is construed,
however, it is unsuccessful.
one hand, granting a motion to reconsider is an
"extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the
interests of finality and conservation of judicial
resources." Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934,
945 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al.,
Moore's Federal Practice § 59.3O (3d ed. 2000)).
"Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court
(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2)
committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly
unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in
controlling law." Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah
Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.
1993). In some cases, "other, highly unusual,
circumstances" may also warrant reconsideration.
Id. Here, Plaintiffs have not presented any basis
for the Court to reconsider its prior orders. There is no
newly discovered evidence, the Court did not commit clear
error, and there has been no intervening change in
other hand, Rule 60 provides an avenue for relief from a
final judgment based on any of the grounds enumerated in the
Rule or for "any other reason that justifies
relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). With respect to the Rule 60
grounds for relief, however, Plaintiffs' motion is vague
and incoherent. Plaintiffs argue that the Court's
judgment is void because it was based on a "fraud upon
this court." (Mot. 2, ECF No. 69.) That
"fraud" appears to be the fact that Plaintiffs
failed to respond to Chase's motion to close the case.
Plaintiffs appear to assert that they were unable to respond
to that motion because their appeal was pending at the Ninth
Circuit. This is not true, however; the appeal was dismissed
on May 19, 2016, and the motion to close the case was not
filed until June 2, 2017. Moreover, while the Court did
observe in its order closing the case that Plaintiffs had not
actively litigated the case in over a year, the Court's
decision was not based merely on "the lack of Plaintiffs
filing [sic] in this case." (Id.) The Court had
previously granted Defendants' motions to dismiss and
given Plaintiffs leave to amend. Plaintiffs failed to amend
their pleading. Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved the Court to
reconsider its order dismissing the case, and that motion was
denied. Those circumstances, combined with Plaintiffs'
failure to oppose the motion to close the case, constituted
grounds for the final judgment.
argument that they were unable to respond to the motion to
close the case because it was never served upon them is also
without merit. The motion was mailed to Plaintiffs at the
address they had provided on the Court's docket.
(See Certificate of Service, ECF No. 65 at 4.)
Plaintiffs then updated their address on the docket over two
months later. (Notice of Change of Address, ECF No. 68.)
Under Local Rule IA 3-1, each party individually bears the
burden of maintaining a current address on the docket. A pro
se party "must immediately file with the court written
notification of any change of mailing address, email address,
telephone number, or facsimile number." Plaintiffs'
failure to update their address in a timely manner is not an
excuse for their failure to respond to the motion to close
remaining arguments are either clearly contradicted by the
recorded documents reviewed by the Court at the time of
considering Defendants' motions to dismiss, or have no
basis in the law. For example, the writ of coram
nobis was abolished many years ago by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(e); see also Telink,
Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1994)
(noting that the writ of coram nobis is still
available in certain criminal cases, "even though the
procedure authorizing the issuance of the writ was abolished
for civil cases"). In short, Plaintiffs have identified
no grounds for relief from the judgment under Rule 60.
HEREBY ORDERED that the motion (ECF ...