United States District Court, D. Nevada
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION OF WASHOE COUNTY, Plaintiff,
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 533, and DOES I-X, inclusive, Defendant.
MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Regional Transportation Commission of Washoe County
(“RTC” or “Plaintiff”) seeks
declaratory relief regarding its plan to activate the audio
portion of a recording system already installed on its buses,
which are operated by members of Defendant Teamsters Local
533 (“the Union” or “Defendant”).
Before the Court is RTC's Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Plaintiff's Motion”) (ECF No. 26) and the
Union's Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Defendant's Motion”) (ECF No.
The Court has reviewed RTC's response and reply (ECF Nos.
31, 33) and the Union's response and reply (ECF Nos. 32,
34) as well as all accompanying exhibits.
reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's Motion is granted
and Defendant's Motion is denied.
initiated this action on December 1, 2014, in the Second
Judicial District Court for Washoe County. (ECF No. 26 at 1;
ECF No. 28 at 6.) The case was removed on December 22, 2014.
(ECF No. 1.) In their Complaint, RTC asks that this Court
enter a declaratory judgment finding that activation of the
audio component of Mobile View does not violate NRS §
200.640 or § 200.650 or the Union Contract. (ECF No. 1-2
at 5-6.) The facts in this case are not at issue.
the exclusive right to operate a system of public
transportation in Washoe County. (ECF No. 1-2 at 2; ECF No.
26 at 2.) RTC contracted with MV Transportation, Inc.
(“MV”) to operate RTC's assets, including
public buses. (ECF No. 1-2 at 2; ECF No. 26 at 2; ECF No. 28
at 9.) The Union represents the drivers of RTC buses. (ECF
No. 26 at 2; ECF No. 28 at 6.) MV and the Union entered into
a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA” or
“Agreement”), which governs drivers and other
employees who operate RTC's buses. (ECF No. 26 at 2; ECF
No. 28 at 9.) Each RTC bus is equipped with two audio-video
recording systems: DriveCam and Mobile View. (ECF No. 26 at
2; ECF No. 28 at 10.) At the front of each bus is a notice
posted in both English and Spanish informing individuals that
“this vehicle may be equipped with audio and video
surveillance.” (ECF No. 26 at 2.)
issue here is activation and use of the audio component of
Mobile View. Mobile View is a system of 6 to 12 cameras
placed on each RTC bus. (ECF No. 26 at 3.) It continuously
records video, which is stored for up to 7 days after which
the video is recorded over. (ECF No. 26 at 3.) A recording
can be retrieved at any time prior to being recorded over.
(ECF No. 26 at 3.) The Mobile View system also has a camera
that has a microphone, which is placed at the front of the
bus near the fare box. (ECF No. 26 at 3.) This microphone is
capable of recording audio of conversations around the driver
as well as noises that can be heard by the bus driver. (ECF
No. 26 at 3.) The microphone is currently not enabled on RTC
March 21, 2014, MV provided notice to its bus drivers that
the audio component of Mobile View would be activated. (ECF
No. 26 at 4.) The notice stated that activation of the
microphone of Mobile View would be effective as of April 21,
2014. (ECF No. 26 at 4.) On April 1, the President of the
Union, Gary Watson, notified MV that the Union objected to
activation of the microphone and audio recording. (ECF No. 26
at 4; ECF No. 28 at 11.) As a result of the Union's
objection and threat of criminal penalties, RTC decided to
defer implementation of the audio recording and to seek
declaratory judgment in this action. (ECF No. 26 at 4.)
purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials
when there is no dispute as to the facts before the
court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't
of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
330 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there is a
sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable
fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute
is “material” if it could affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). Where
reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue,
however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See
id. at 250-51. “The amount of evidence necessary
to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to
require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing
versions of the truth at trial.'” Aydin Corp.
v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983)
(quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co.,
391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). In evaluating a summary
judgment motion, a court views all facts and /// draws all
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore,
Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986).
moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib.
Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). “In
order to carry its burden of production, the moving party
must either produce evidence negating an essential element of
the nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the
nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential
element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at
trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd v.
Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).
Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements,
the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to
“set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 256. The nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in
the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through
affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the
dispute exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc.,
929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am.,
NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002)
(internal citations omitted). “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's
position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252.
“when parties submit cross-motions for summary
judgment, ‘[e]ach motion must be considered on its own
merits.'” Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty.,
Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir.
2001) (quoting William W. Schwarzer, et al., The Analysis
and Decision of Summary Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D.
441, 499 (Feb. 1992) (additional citations omitted)).
“In fulfilling its duty to review each cross-motion
separately, the court must review the evidence submitted in
support of each cross-motion.” Id.
Motion argues that activating the audio component of the
recording system does not violate NRS §§ 200.640 or
200.650 and that it is not a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining pursuant to the CBA. By contrast, Defendant's
Motion argues the exact opposite on each point raised by
Plaintiff and raises the additional argument that activating
the audio component is a mandatory subject of bargaining
under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that ...