from a district court order dismissing a quiet title action.
Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Elissa F.
Law and Jacob L. Hafter, Las Vegas, for Appellant.
& Allison, APC, and Mark H. Hutchings, Las Vegas, and
Jeffrey S. Allison, Irvine, California, for Respondent.
THE COURT EN BANC.
11.190(1)(b) provides that an aggrieved party under a
contract may not commence a civil action if more than six
years have elapsed since the cause of action accrued or the
moment that the aggrieved party discovers or reasonably
should have discovered facts supporting a cause of action.
However, a lender may also pursue a nonjudicial foreclosure
available when a borrower fails to meet his or her obligation
under a promissory note that is secured by a deed of trust.
the nonjudicial foreclosure stems from the deed of trust,
which exists only because of the underlying promissory note,
we are asked to apply NRS 11.190(1)(b)'s statute of
limitations for contract actions to nonjudicial foreclosures.
We decline to do so because statutes of limitations only
apply to judicial actions, and a nonjudicial foreclosure by
its very nature is not a judicial action.
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2006, appellant Amy Facklam entered into a home loan
agreement, wherein she signed a promissory note that was
secured by a deed of trust on the subject property. In 2009,
Facklain defaulted on said loan and the prior mortgage
servicer recorded a notice of default. The prior servicer
eventually filed a rescission of its election to declare
2013, respondent HSBC became the beneficiary of the
promissory note and deed of trust on Facklam's home. In
2016, after Facklam defaulted again, HSBC recorded a notice
of default and election to sell the property. The notice
provided, in bolded capital letters, that if Facklam failed
to pay the entire debt that was due, HSBC would sell the
property "without any court action."
commenced the present action to quiet title and extinguish
HSBC's interest in the property. She claimed that HSBC
was barred from foreclosing on the mortgaged property because
the six-year limitation period began running with the initial
notice of default in 2009 and, therefore, expired in 2015.
moved for summary judgment, and HSBC filed an opposition and
countermotion to dismiss. The district court denied
Facklam's motion for summary judgment and dismissed
Facklam's complaint, finding that any potential
acceleration created in 2009 was canceled when the prior
servicer filed its rescission in 2011.