United States District Court, D. Nevada
MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
case concerns an employment discrimination claim brought by a
former employee of Continental Micronesia, Inc.
(“CMI”) against CMI and United Airlines
(“United”). Before the Court is Defendant
CMI's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's response
and CMI's reply. For the reasons discussed below,
CMI's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
following facts are taken from Plaintiff Anthony
Fejeran's (“Plaintiff” or
“Fejeran”) First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”). (ECF No. 38.)
began his employment with Continental Airlines
(“Continental”) on March 16, 1991. In May 2012, a
physician employed by the United Airlines Family Medical
Center in Guam prescribed Fejeran the painkiller Tramadol for
a work-related foot pain. Immediately after beginning to take
Tramadol, Fejeran suffered from headaches, anxiety, and panic
issues. Over the following year, Fejeran experienced anxiety
and an inability to focus. In August of 2012, Fejeran's
employer placed him on a termination warning for
reacting improperly to an inflight/onboard situation. In
February of 2013, Fejeran's employer launched an
investigation when Fejeran's Flight Operating Manual was
found to be incorrect. On February 22, 2013, a
United-employed physician placed Fejeran on approved leave
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)
and referred him to a neurologist for an evaluation,
including an MRI. Ultimately, Fejeran was diagnosed with
Bipolar II Manic disorder as a result of taking Tramadol.
April 5, 2013, Fejeran's employer required him to attend
a meeting in Las Vegas, during which he was incoherent and
unable to represent himself. His employer then informed him
of a mandatory meeting to be held in Guam on May 7, 2013.
Clarissa Perez, employed by Fejeran's employer,
reiterated to Fejeran that the meeting was mandatory because
he was on a “Last Chance Agreement.” (ECF No. 38
at 4.) Fejeran's employer denied Fejeran's reasonable
request for accommodation to reschedule the meeting or to
participate by conference call. On May 10, 2013, Scott
Goodman and Cynthia Iverson of the Association of Flight
Attendants called Fejeran to let him know he would be
terminated unless he agreed to retire that day. Scott
Goodman, who was the Association of Flight Attendants'
counsel, informed Fejeran that the “Company's
position is that they must see an email from you today or
they will withdraw their offer.” (Id. at 5.)
February 20, 2014, Fejeran filed a Charge of Discrimination
with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). On October 7, 2015, the EEOC
issued a Notice of Right to Sue Letter. The initial
complaint in this case (ECF No. 1) was filed on January 6,
asserts two claims for relief: (1) disability discrimination,
harassment and failure to accommodate pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111 et seq. and NRS § 613.330; and (2)
violation of FMLA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et
seq. (ECF No. 38 at 5-7.)
opposing a defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing that jurisdiction is proper. Boschetto v.
Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). Where, as
here, the defendant's motions are based on written
materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, “the
plaintiff need only make ‘a prima facie showing of
jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to
dismiss.'” Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon
& Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151,
1154 (9th Cir. 2006)). The plaintiff cannot “simply
rest on the bare allegations of its complaint, ” but
uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as
true. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374
F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Amba Mktg.
Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int'l, Inc., 551 F.2d
784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977)). The court “may not assume
the truth of allegations in a pleading which are contradicted
by affidavit, ” Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech.
Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977), but
it may resolve factual disputes in the plaintiff's favor.
Pebble Beach Co., 453 F.3d at 1154.
two-part analysis governs whether a court retains personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. “First, the
exercise of jurisdiction must satisfy the requirements of the
applicable state long-arm statute.” Chan v.
Soc'y Expeditions, 39 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir.
1994). Since “Nevada's long-arm statute, NRS
[§] 14.065, reaches the limits of due process set by the
United States Constitution, ” the Court moves on to the
second part of the analysis. See Baker v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 999 P.2d 1020, 1023
(Nev. 2000). “Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must
comport with federal due process.” Chan, 39
F.3d at 1404-05. “Due process requires that nonresident
defendants have certain minimum contacts with the forum state
so that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Id. at 1405 (citing Int'l
Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Courts
analyze this constitutional question with reference to two
forms of jurisdiction: general and specific jurisdiction.
argues that this Court has general jurisdiction over CMI
based on the theory that CMI is the alter ego of United or,
in the alternative, that the Court has specific jurisdiction
over CMI based on an April 5, 2013, meeting ...