United States District Court, D. Nevada
ORDER DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF MARTIN GUZMAN
PEREZ AND DEFENDANT MARTIN GUZMAN PEREZ D/B/A EL RAYO
TRANSPORTATION'S (ERRONEOUSLY SUED AS EL RAYO) MOTION TO
COMPEL DISCOVERY AGAINST PLAINTIFF (ECF NO. 48)
FERENBACH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter concerns Plaintiff Deyssi Janneth Prado-Guajardo's
personal injury suit against Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff
Martin Guzman Perez and Defendant El Rayo (collectively,
“Perez”) for negligently causing a vehicle
accident in which Prado-Guajardo sustained injuries. Before
the Court is Perez's Motion to Compel Discovery Against
Plaintiff (ECF No. 48). Prado-Guajardo filed a Response to
Defendants' Motion to Compel (ECF No. 49), and Perez
filed a Reply (ECF No. 51). For the reasons stated below,
Perez's Motion to Compel is granted.
action arises from a non-collision accident between
Prado-Guajardo's motorcycle and Perez's semi-truck on
December 5, 2013. See ECF No. 32. Due to injuries
Prado-Guajardo sustained from this accident, which she
alleges Perez caused, Prado-Guajardo filed a complaint
against Perez for negligence and negligence per se on
December 4, 2015 in Nevada District Court. See ECF
No. 1 at 1. Perez removed the action to federal court on
March 11, 2016. Id.
August 2016, Perez filed a Third-Party Complaint for
indemnity and contribution against Third-Party Defendant
Shayna Diaz. The Third-Party Complaint alleges that Diaz was
the registered owner of the motorcycle that Prado-Guajardo
operated and the insured under a motorcycle insurance policy
on the day of the accident. Prado-Guajardo filed an amended
complaint in February 2017, naming El Rayo as an additional
defendant. See ECF No. 32 at 1.
of discovery, on August 8, 2016, and January 26, 2017, Perez
served Prado-Guajardo with Requests for the Production of
Documents. See ECF No. 48-1 at 3, 26. Both
requested, among other things, that Prado-Guajardo execute
authorization and consent forms for Guzman to obtain
Prado-Guajardo's employment, worker's compensation,
insurance claims, and Medicare records. Id. at 8-9,
32-33. Prado-Guajardo objects to these requests on the ground
that the requests are “not reasonably calculated to
lead to admissible evidence” and that she is not making
a claim for lost wages. The parties attempted, but could not
resolve the matter. See ECF No. 47 at 9, 12; see
also LR 26-7(c). On June 27, 2017, Guzman filed the
instant motion to compel Prado-Guajardo to execute the
authorizations submitted by Perez for Perez to obtain
Prado-Guajardo's employment, worker's compensation,
insurance claims, and Medicare records. See ECF No.
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) governs discovery's
scope and limits. It states:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of
the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake
in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties'
relative access to relevant information, the parties'
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within
this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Civ. P. 34 governs the productions of documents. It provides,
in pertinent part, that “[a] party may serve on any
other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b): (1) to
produce … the following items in the responding
party's possession, custody, or control: (A) any
designated documents or electronically stored information
… stored in any medium from which information can be
obtained ….” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a)(1)(A).
party resists discovery, the requesting party may file a
motion to compel. Rule 37 governs motions to compel.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). Fed.R.Civ.P.
37(a)(3)(B)(iv) provides that a party seeking discovery may
move for an order compelling production against another party
when a party fails to produce documents requested under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 34. A motion to compel must certify that the
movant has “in good faith conferred or attempted to
confer” with the party resisting discovery.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); see also LR
resisting discovery carry the heavy burden of showing why
discovery should be denied. See Blankenship v. Hearst
Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). The objecting
party must show that the discovery request is overly broad,
unduly burdensome irrelevant. See EnvTech, Inc. v.
Suchard, Case No. 3:11-cv-523-HDM-WGC, 2013 WL 4899085
at* 5 (D. Nev. Sept. 11, 2013) (“it is well-settled
that a party objecting to discovery must state its objection
with specificity.”). To meet this burden, the objecting
party must specifically detail the reasons why each request
is improper. See Walker v. Lakewood Condo. Owners
Ass'n, 186 F.R.D. 584, 587 (C.D.Cal. 1999).
Boilerplate, generalized objections are inadequate and
tantamount to making no objection at all. See Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States Dist. Court,
408 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that boilerplate
objections or blanket refusals in response to Rule 34
requests for production are insufficient); 7 James Wm. Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice, § 34.13 (3d ed.
2017) (“An objection to a Rule 34 request must clearly
set forth the specifics of the objection and how that
objection relates to the documents being demanded. Generic,
non-specific objections are improper.”).
court has broad discretion in controlling discovery and in
determining whether discovery is burdensome or oppressive.
See Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685
(9th Cir. 1988); see also Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Rebel
Oil. Inc., 157 F.R.D. 691, 696 (D. Nev. 1994). The court
may fashion any order which justice requires to protect a
party or person from undue burden, oppression, or expense.
United States v. Columbia Board. Sys., Inc., 666
F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir.1982) cert. denied, 457 U.S.
Motion to Compel concerns four ...