United States District Court, D. Nevada
ORDER THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXTEND
DISCOVERY DEADLINES (ECF NO. 46)
FERENBACH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is Third-Party Defendant Shayna Diaz's Motion
to Extend Discovery Deadlines (ECF No. 46).
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Martin Guzman Perez filed a
Limited Joinder to Third-Party Defendant's Motion to
Extend Discovery Deadlines (ECF No. 47). For the reasons
stated below, Diaz's Motion is denied.
Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) governs the modification of
scheduling orders. In pertinent part, it provides that
“[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and
with the judge's consent.” See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(b)(4). In the context of Rule 16, good cause is
measured by diligence. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats
Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604,
607-09 (9th Cir. 1992)). The rule permits modification of a
scheduling order, but only if the existing deadlines cannot
be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the
extension. See Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1295. Where the
movant “fail[s] to show diligence, the inquiry should
end.” Id. (citation and quotation marks
Rule 26-4 supplements Federal Rule 16. It states:
A motion or stipulation to extend any date set by the
discovery plan, scheduling order, or other order must, in
addition to satisfying the requirements of LR IA 6-1, be
supported by a showing of good cause for the extension
… A request made after the expiration of the subject
deadline will not be granted unless the movant also
demonstrates that the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect. A motion or stipulation to extend a
discovery deadline … must include:
(a) A statement specifying the discovery completed;
(b) A specific description of the discovery that remains to
(c) The reasons why the deadline was not satisfied or the
remaining discovery was not completed within the time limits
set by the discovery plan; and
(d) A proposed schedule for completing all remaining
See Local Rule 26-4.
neglect approximates negligence. See Lemoge v. United
States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 2009). Courts
consider four factors when determining whether neglect is
excusable: (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party;
(2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the
proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether
the movant acted in good faith. See Bateman v. United
States Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (9th Cir.
2000) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc.
Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). This
determination is equitable, Pioneer, 507 U.S. at
395, and left to this Court's discretion. See Pincay
v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 860 (9th Cir. 2004).
orders are critical to the Court's management of its
docket. The Court is charged with securing “the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Delay
frustrates this command. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has
emphasized that a case management order “is not a
frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be
cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.”
See Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d at 610
(internal quotations and citations omitted).