United States District Court, D. Nevada
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiffs,
MISSION POINTE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Defendants.
before the court is plaintiff U.S. Bank, National
Association's (the “Bank”) motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 22). Defendant Mission Pointe Homeowners
Association (the “HOA”) filed a response to the
motion outside of the 21-day deadline for submission of the
same. See LR 7-2(b); see also (ECF No. 23).
Therefore, defendant's response will be stricken, but the
lack of opposition to a motion for summary judgment is not
sufficient for the automatic success of that motion. (ECF No.
23); see also LR 7-2(d).
action involves the nonjudicial foreclosure of the real
property at 10245 S. Maryland Parkway Unit 2194, Las Vegas,
Nevada. (ECF No. 1).
Bank alleges three claims against the HOA: (1) declaratory
relief to quiet title; (2) unjust enrichment; and (3)
injunctive relief. (Id.).
Bank further admits in its motion that, although the
contested foreclosure sale occurred on October 7, 2011, it
did not receive its purported interest in the property until
Nationstar Mortgage LLC assigned to it the senior deed of
trust on May 1, 2014. (ECF No. 22); see also (ECF
Nos. 22-3, 22-7).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims . . . .” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323- 24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the
non-moving party must “set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
determining summary judgment, the court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden
Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000).
Moreover, “[i]n such a case, the moving party has the
initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue
of fact on each issue material to its case.”
contrast, when the non-moving party bears the burden of
proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its
burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an
essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2)
by demonstrating that the non-moving party failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden,
summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
consider the non-moving party's evidence. See Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159- 60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.
standing to bring a claim, a complaint must show the
satisfaction of three prongs:
(1) a party must have suffered an “injury in fact,
” which is an actual or imminent invasion of a legally
protected, concrete, and particularized interest, (2)
“there must be a causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of, ” and (3) it must be