United States District Court, D. Nevada
FERENBACH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
matter involves a homeowner's association
(“HOA”) foreclosure of a single family residence.
Before the Court is JP Morgan Chase's
(“Chase's”) motion to compel (ECF No. 93). No
Opposition has been filed. For the reasons stated below,
Chase's motion to compel is granted.
Claire Ali obtained a $278, 400 loan to purchase a home
located at 8769 Country View Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89129.
(ECF No. 84 at 1). The loan was secured by a deed of trust.
Defendant Chase is the beneficiary of that deed of trust and
Defendant MTC Financial, Inc. is the trustee. Id. at
2. As a result of Ali's failure to pay HOA fees, the HOA
foreclosed and on September 5, 2012 Daisy Trust purchased the
home for $8600 at a foreclosure sale. Id. Daisy
Trust commenced this suit seeking quiet title, declaratory
relief and to enjoin any party from foreclosing on the home.
Id. MTC removed the action to this court and claimed
Ali was joined as a sham defendant. Id. Daisy Trust
moved to remand but the court denied the motion. Thereafter,
the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Weeping Hollow
Avenue Trust v. Spencer (holding former homeowner is not
a fraudulently- joined party to a quiet title action in a HOA
foreclosure because a former homeowner may challenge the
foreclosure on equitable grounds). (ECF No. 93 at 2). Daisy
Trust then moved for reconsideration of the order denying
remand based on the change in controlling law. (ECF No. 84 at
3). The Court granted Daisy Trust's Motion to Reconsider
in part setting aside its prior order concerning Ali being a
fraudulently joined party and disregarding her citizenship
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 11.
The Court also determined there was insufficient evidence to
establish the citizenship of Daisy Trust. Id. at 5.
On December 6, 2016, U.S. District Judge Jones granted
Defendants ninety days to proffer evidence of Daisy
Trust's citizenship. Id. at 7, 11.
Court ordered that it was necessary to determine the nature
of Daisy Trust, if there is a fiduciary relationship, and if
so, the citizenship of the trustee; and if an unassociated
entity, the citizenship of its members. Id. at 7-8.
Chase then served jurisdictional interrogatories and requests
for production on Daisy Trust on February 1, 2017. (ECF No.
93 at 3). Chase sought information related to Daisy
Trust's form of trust, principal place of business,
citizenship of trustees, members and beneficiaries and other
pertinent facts. Id. The instant motion concerns
Daisy Trust's response to Chase's written discovery,
which Chase argues was insufficient.
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) governs discovery's
scope and limits. In pertinent part, Rule 26(b)(1) provides
that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's
claim or defense.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Rule 26
defines relevant information as any information that
“appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.” Id. Rule 26 is
liberally construed. Seattle Times, Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984).
here-a party resists discovery, the requesting party may file
a motion to compel discovery. Rule 37 governs motions to
compel. In pertinent part, it provides that a “party
seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer,
designation, production, or inspection” if a party
fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule
33” or “fails to respond” to a request
under Rule 34. Before moving to compel, Rule 37 requires the
movant to include a certification that the movant has
“in good faith conferred or attempted to confer”
with the party resisting discovery before seeking judicial
intervention. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(1); see also
ShuffleMaster, Inc. v. Progressive Games, Inc., 170
F.R.D. 166, 171 (D. Nev. 1996) (discussing the meet and
resisting discovery carry the heavy burden of showing why
discovery should be denied. Blankenship v. Hearst
Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). The objecting
party must show that the discovery request is overly broad,
unduly burdensome irrelevant. Teller v. Dogge, No.
2:12-cv-00591-JCM, 2013 WL 1501445 (D. Nev. Apr. 10, 2013)
(Magistrate Judge Foley) (citing Graham v. Casey's
General Stores, 206 F.R.D. 251, 253-4 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
this burden, the objecting party must specifically detail the
reasons why each request is improper. Walker v. Lakewood
Condo. Owners Ass'n, 186 F.R.D. 584, 587 (C.D. Cal.
1999). Boilerplate, generalized objections are inadequate and
tantamount to making no objection at all. Id.
(citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d
1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986) (objecting party must show a
particularized harm is likely to occur if the requesting
party obtains the information that is the subject of the
particular objections; generalized objections are
the party opposing discovery must allege (1) specific facts,
which indicate the nature and extent of the burden, usually
by affidavit or other reliable evidence, or (2) sufficient
detail regarding the time, money and procedures required to
comply with the purportedly improper request. Jackson v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 173 F.R.D. 524
(D. Nev. 1997) (citations omitted); Cory v. Aztec Steel
Bldg., Inc., 225 F .R.D. 667, 672 (D. Kan. 2005).
court has broad discretion in controlling discovery, see
Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir.
1988), and in determining whether discovery is burdensome or
oppressive. Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Rebel Oil.
Inc., 157 F.R.D. 691, 696 (D. Nev.1994). The court may
fashion any order which justice requires to protect a party
or person from undue burden, oppression, or expense.
United States v. Columbia Board. Sys., Inc., 666
F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir.1982) cert. denied, 457 U.S.
motion to compel raises two questions: (1) whether Daisy
Trust should be compelled to respond to Chase's discovery
request and, if so, (2) whether the Court should order Daisy
Trust to pay Chase's fees, costs, and expenses in