United States District Court, D. Nevada
MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is a motion to dismissed (“Motion”)
filed by Renown Health (“Renown”) and Alma
Medina, Allie Saunders, Tena Thomas, Suzanne Oetjen, Mandy
Roberts, Leon Gill, Megan Pailing, Katherine Sims and Sonia
Torres (collectively, “Individual
Defendants”). (ECF No. 27.) The Court has reviewed
Plaintiff's response (ECF No. 35) and Defendants'
reply (ECF No. 40). For the reasons discussed below,
Defendants' Motion is granted.
Shaun Robinson initiated this employment dispute against his
former employer, Renown Health, and Individual Defendants who
allegedly participated in gender discrimination against
Plaintiff. In connection with Plaintiff's Application to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP
application”), the Court screened Plaintiff's
proposed complaint, first amended complaint and second
amended complaint (“SAC”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915. (ECF Nos. 5, 8, 11.) The Court permitted
Plaintiff to proceed on counts one through six (alleging
Title VII violations) and count eight (alleging infliction of
emotional distress), and dismissed count seven (alleging
defamation and intrusion upon seclusion). (ECF No. 11.) The
following facts are taken from the SAC (ECF No. 13.)
a Caucasian man, became a Certified Nursing Assistant
(“CNA”) in October 2013. (Id. at 8-9.)
Plaintiff received an offer of employment from Renown on
November 18, 2013, which he accepted. (Id. at 9.)
Plaintiff was the only male dayshift CNA on the floor where
he worked and was subjected to alleged discriminatory
treatment because of his gender, including receiving a poor
90-day performance evaluation, getting more burdensome work
assignments, being refused assistance with patients and phone
coverage for breaks from his female co-workers, and being
subjected to name calling, intimidation and ridicule.
(Id. at 9-14.) Plaintiff complained about his poor
performance evaluation and alleged discrimination, but his
complaints were not addressed. (Id. at 14-16.)
Plaintiff's employment was suspended on October 8, 2014,
and terminated on October 16, 2014, for alleged patient
documentation issues which Plaintiff claims were false.
(Id. at 17-20.)
initial matter, Plaintiff argues that because the Court
screened his SAC, Defendants' Motion essentially ask for
reconsideration of the Court's screening order. (ECF No.
6-7.) While the Court applies the same standard for
determining whether the SAC states a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6) when screening the SAC as required /// under 28
U.S.C. § 1915, a defendant is not foreclosed from
seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
may dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A properly pleaded complaint must
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not
require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than
“labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step
approach district courts are to apply when considering
motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as
true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint;
however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption
of truth. Id. at 678-79. Mere recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Id. at 678. Second, a
district court must consider whether the factual allegations
in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief.
Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the
plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allow a court to
draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678. Where the
complaint fails to “permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged
- but it has not ‘shown' - ‘that the pleader
is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration omitted). When the
claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from
conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A complaint must contain
either direct or inferential allegations concerning
“all the material elements necessary to sustain
recovery under some viable legal theory.”
Id. at 562 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
of the fact that “[t]he Supreme Court has instructed
the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful
pleading' of pro se litigants, ” the Court
will view Plaintiff's pleadings with the appropriate
degree of leniency. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d
1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)).
Motion seeks dismissal of the following claims in the SAC:
(1) Title VII claims (the first six claims) against the
Individual Defendants; (2) eighth claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress; (3) first and sixth claims
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (4) third
and fourth claims as they are duplicative of Plaintiff's
second claim and fifth claim, respectively. (ECF No. 27.) The
Court will address each request in turn below.
Title VII Claims Against ...