United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is defendant Reynolds Polymer Technology,
Inc.'s (“Reynolds”) motion to dismiss. (ECF
No. 6). Plaintiff Steven Malcom filed a response
(ECF No. 8), to which Reynolds replied (ECF No. 10).
action arises from the destruction of plaintiff's
aquarium allegedly caused by a product defect. Plaintiff, a
resident of Scotland, contacted defendant Acrylic Tank
Manufacturing of Nevada (“ATM”) in 2007 to
“design, engineer, fabricate, and install a custom
state-of-the-art . . . aquarium.” (ECF No. 1 at 3).
After receiving the contract, ATM contacted Reynolds in June
of 2007 to manufacture the tank. (ECF No. 6 at 16).
completed fabrication of the tank and shipped it directly to
Scotland from its warehouse in Colorado. (ECF No. 6 at 6).
The tank's dimensions measured 3.5 meters in diameter by
10 meters in height-the tank was designed to accommodate
approximately 25, 000 gallons of water. (ECF No. 1-1 at 2).
Reynolds did not participate in the tank's installation
as “ATM supplied its own engineers and builders to
install the aquarium” in plaintiff's home. (ECF No.
1 at 3). ATM completed installation in Scotland in March
2010. (ECF No 1 at 3). On November 30, 2015, approximately
five years and eight months later, the tank allegedly
collapsed and its contents flowed through plaintiff's
home causing damages in excess of £5, 900, 00.00 GBP
($7, 550, 000.00). (Id.).
April 21, 2017, plaintiff filed the underlying complaint
alleging seven claims of relief: (1) breach of contract
against ATM; (2) breach of implied warranty of
merchantability against ATM; (3) breach of implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose against ATM; (4)
negligence against ATM and Reynolds; (5) strict liability
against ATM and Reynolds; (6) breach of implied warranty of
merchantability against Reynolds; and (7) breach of implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose against
Reynolds. (ECF No. 1).
instant motion, Reynolds argues that dismissal of claims (4)
through (7), as they relate to Reynolds, is appropriate
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) because
the court lacks personal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 6).
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) allows a defendant to move
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). To avoid dismissal under Rule
12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
that its allegations establish a prima facie case
for personal jurisdiction. See Boschetto v. Hansing,
539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). Allegations in the
complaint must be taken as true and factual disputes should
be construed in the plaintiff's favor. Rio Props.,
Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019
(9th Cir. 2002).
no federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, the
district court applies the law of the forum state.”
Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1015; see also Panavision
Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir.
1998). Where a state has a “long-arm” statute
providing its courts jurisdiction to the fullest extent
permitted by the due process clause, as Nevada does, a court
need only address federal due process standards. See
Arbella Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
134 P.3d 710, 712 (Nev. 2006) (citing Nev. Rev. Stat. §
14.065); see also Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1015.
assertion of personal jurisdiction must comport with due
process. See Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods
Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 2012). Two categories
of personal jurisdiction exist: (1) general jurisdiction; and
(2) specific jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1984);
LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d
1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
jurisdiction arises where a defendant has continuous and
systematic ties with the forum state, even if those ties are
unrelated to the litigation. See Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A., 466 U.S.
at 414-16). “[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate the
defendant has sufficient contacts to constitute the kind of
continuous and systematic general business contacts that
approximate physical presence.” In re W. States
Wholesale Nat. Gas Litig., 605 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1131 (D.
Nev. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In other words, defendant's affiliations with the forum
state must be so “continuous and systematic” as
to render it essentially “at home” in that forum.
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 760-61
(2014) (“Daimler”). “This is an
exacting standard as it should be, because a finding of
general jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into
court in the forum state to answer for its activities
anywhere in the world.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred
Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004).
jurisdiction arises where sufficient contacts with the forum
state exist such that the assertion of personal jurisdiction
“does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.'” Int'l Shoe
Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The
Ninth Circuit has established a three-prong test for
analyzing an assertion of specific personal jurisdiction:
(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his
activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or
resident thereof; or perform some act by which he
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the ...